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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, in Jaffee v. Redmond,1 the U.S. Supreme Court, pursuant to the authority set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 501, recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the federal courts.2 In
doing so, the Court acknowledged the essential role that confidentiality plays in a therapist-patient relationship and also recognized
the important role that psychotherapy plays in the mental health of
the American citizenry.3 However, in dicta set out in a footnote near
the conclusion of the opinion (footnote 19 of the opinion), the Court
suggested that the privilege might not be absolute, that it might need
to “give way [in situations where] . . . a serious threat of harm to the
patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by
the therapist.”4
In the years since this decision, the lower federal courts have
wrestled with how to determine the contours of the psychotherapistpatient privilege, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s comments contained within footnote 19. Currently, the federal circuit
courts are split over whether the Court intended to establish a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and
the situations in which this exception would be appropriate. A year
1.
2.
3.
4.

518 U.S. 1 (1996).
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 18 n.19.
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and a half after Jaffee was decided, the Tenth Circuit, in United
States v. Glass,5 crafted a dangerous-patient exception to the privilege, which was fashioned after the criteria set forth by the Jaffee
Court in footnote 19.6 However, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have
refused to recognize the exception on the grounds that the footnote is
dicta and that a dangerous-patient exception contravenes the rationale and the holding of the Jaffee opinion.7
This article addresses the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege and argues against the recognition of
this exception. Parts I and II of this article present a discussion of
the history of privileges and the development of the psychotherapistpatient privilege, culminating with an in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jaffee. This section also includes a brief
discussion of the two distinct rationales supporting privileges: the
deontological rationale and the utilitarian rationale espoused by
Dean John Henry Wigmore and adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Part III of this article presents the opinions of the federal circuit
courts that have grappled with the question of whether to recognize
the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
In Part IV, this article sets forth reasons why the Glass court and
the other courts that have adopted the Glass test are wrong. It explains that the comments set forth in the Jaffee footnote are mere
obiter dicta and, thus, have negligible value. It also demonstrates
that interpreting this footnote as authorizing a dangerous-patient exception is wholly inconsistent with the Jaffee opinion and the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of the legislative history of Federal Rule
of Evidence 501, particularly the proposed but rejected rules related
to privileges. Part IV also argues that the Glass court erred in crafting the test by failing to conduct the proper legal analysis in light of
the privileges that the Supreme Court set forth in Jaffee and, two
years later, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.8

5. 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
6. Id. at 1359.
7. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584–85 (6th Cir. 2000).
8. 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
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Part IV also addresses the “reason and experience” requirement
of Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which provides that privileges are
to be governed by the principles of the common law “as they may be
interpreted by the [federal] courts . . . in light of reason and experience.”9 This section presents the reasons why “reason and experience” do not support the recognition of the dangerous-patient exception to the privilege. It shows not only that there is no clear consensus among the states with respect to a therapist’s duty to protect
third parties, but also that there is much confusion among the laws of
the states with respect to the dangerous-patient exception. Finally,
this section examines the “reason and experience” requirement of
Rule 501 in light of the commonly recognized exceptions to the other federal communication privileges. It concludes that because neither the attorney-client privilege, the spousal privilege, nor the clergy-penitent privilege are subject to a “dangerous-person” exception,
“reason and experience” do not support the recognition of this type
of exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Part V of this article discusses the limited situations in which a
therapist might be compelled to testify about a patient’s confidential
communications. This article concludes with a discussion of, and
recommendation for, procedures that courts should follow when presented with challenges to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. It
recommends that courts conduct in camera review of the evidence
proffered in support of exceptions to the privilege and require that
the proponent of the exception prove the necessary elements by a
preponderance of the evidence. These procedures will provide protection against the needless public disclosure of confidential patient
information and serve to protect the confidentiality of the therapistpatient relationship, which the Jaffee Court recognized is a “sine qua
non for successful psychiatric treatment.”10

9. FED. R. EVID. 501.
10. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).
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II. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PRIVILEGES11
Privileges are a unique aspect of the law of evidence; unlike other rules of evidence designed to improve the reliability of the factfinding process, the rules governing the scope and effect of privileges operate to “impede the search for truth by excluding evidence that
may be highly probative.”12 Privileges are justified by the need to
protect the privacy of certain relationships and the need to encourage
open communications within these relationships.13 The most common privileges include an individual’s right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and the privileges that protect confidential
communications between spouses, attorneys and their clients, and
physicians and their patients.14 The law of privileges has developed
from several sources. Some privileges are provided for in the Constitution, such as the privilege against self-incrimination.15 In the
states, privileges are generally statutory, whereas the federal law of
privileges originates from the common law.16 One of the earliest
privileges to be recognized was the Roman law that refused to compel an attorney to testify against his client during the pendency of a
case.17 Additional privileges came into existence during the early
Middle Ages, beginning with recognition of the priest-penitent privilege.18 This privilege, which had its origin in the seal of confession

11. Certain sections within Parts II and III of this article are taken from a previous article written by the author. See Deborah Paruch, The PsychotherapistPatient Privilege in the Family Court: An Exemplar of Disharmony Between Social Policy Goals, Professional Ethics, and the Current State of the Law, 29 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 499, 501–521 (2009)
12. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 5.1, at
329 (3d ed. 2003).
13. Id.
14. KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 114 (John
W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 2006).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. PAUL C. GIANELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE, § 37.04, at 566 (2d ed.
2006).
17. Daniel W. Shuman, The Origins of the Physician-Patient Privilege and Professional Secret, 39 SW. L.J. 661, 667 (1985).
18. Id. at 668–69.
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and canon law, prohibited priests from revealing confessional confidences.19
The first privilege recognized under the common law of England
was the attorney-client privilege, which was initially recognized during the reign of Elizabeth I20 and “[b]y the time of the American
Revolution . . . was firmly entrenched in the [American] common
law.”21 The rationale for this privilege was that it was a “point of
honor” for gentlemen to not reveal confidences entrusted to them.22
These early privileges are grounded in deontology,23 the school of
ethics that focuses on the inherent rightness or wrongness of actions
themselves, as opposed to the correctness or incorrectness of the
consequences of the actions.24 The deontological approach to privi-

19. Id. at 668. Some contemporary scholars believe that that common law of
England did not recognize the priest-penitent privilege. See id. at 670 n.40 (citing
Edward A. Hogan, Jr., A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional, 6
LOY. L. REV. 1, 2, 13 (1951)).
20. Id. at 669–70. Recognition of the attorney-client privilege followed the passage of the Statute of Elizabeth in 1562–1563 that provided penalties for a witness’s refusal to testify following service of process and offer of payment of expenses. Id. (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW § 2290, at 542–43 (John T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961)). Historically,
the attorney-client privilege belonged to the attorney “as a gentleman” with courts
honoring a gentleman’s pledge of secrecy. Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged
Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1228 (1962) [hereinafter Functional Overlap]. This right was originally held by all gentlemen, “but during the 17th
and 18th centuries it was gradually repudiated.” Id. Lawyers were able to retain
the privilege by maintaining that the privilege, in fact, belonged to the client based
on two different theories: “(1) that the privilege was necessary to assure complete
disclosure by the client and a competent defense by the lawyer; and (2) that the
lawyer was no better than a servant.” Id. (citations omitted). This latter theory is
traced to an ancient rule that prohibited a slave from testifying against a master.
Shuman, supra note 17, at 667.
21. Functional Overlap, supra note 20, at 1229.
22. Shuman, supra note 17, at 671.
23. See Paul S. Appelbaum, Privacy in Psychiatric Treatment: Threats and Responses, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1809, 1810–11 (2002) (discussing the school of
deontological thought in relation to the psychotherapist-patient privilege problem).
24. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 63–64 (Susan Neiburg Terkel & R. Shannon Duval eds., 1999). There are two distinct categories of contemporary ethical theories:
deontological and teleological:
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leges focuses on the importance of the societal values encompassed
in the privilege and recognizes that disclosure of certain confidences
is in and of itself wrong.25
The deontological school of thought views privacy as “an essential ingredient of a democratic society.”26 According to Professor
David Louisell, privileges are “[p]rimarily . . . a right to be let alone,
a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state’s coercive or supervisory powers and from the
nuisance of its eavesdropping.”27 Professor Louisell has also remarked that the fact that the existence of these guarantees sometimes
results in the exclusion of probative evidence at a trial is merely a
secondary and incidental feature of the privileges’ vitality and “not
too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations—husband-wife, client-attorney and penitent-clergyman.”28

Teleological, which encompasses utilitarianism, is the ‘ethics of ends and
consequences.’ 1 JOHN K. ROTH, ETHICS 367 (John K. Roth ed., 2005).
Teleological theories prioritize the good over the right. See id. The good
is defined as ‘the end or purpose of human actions; for example, ‘the
greatest happiness for the greatest number.’ These theories evaluate moral actions in terms of whether they contribute to the good.’ Id. Thus, according to teleological theories, consequences or results will determine
the rightness or wrongness of moral actions. Id. This is contrasted with
deontological theories, which argue for the ‘independence of the right
from the good.’
Id. at 364; Paruch, supra note 11, at 503 n.13.
25. Shuman, supra note 17, at 664 (quoting David W. Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TULSA L. REV.
101, 101 (1956)).
26. Id. at 666 (citing ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1967)). This
concept of privacy was incorporated into the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Justice Brandeis recognized this in his dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, where he stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness . . . . They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. Louisell, supra note 25, at 110–11.
28. Id. at 109–10.
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Some two hundred years after the attorney-client privilege was
first recognized in English common law, the English courts were
called upon to address the physician-patient privilege. This occurred
in the 1776 bigamy trial of Elizabeth, the Duchess of Kingston.29
This decision is viewed as a critical turning point in the law of privileges because it was then that courts began to apply a utilitarian test
to privileges, where the importance of the evidence replaced ethics
as the standard for recognition of privileges.30 In the utilitarian approach, also referred to as the instrumental rationale, privileges are
viewed as obstructions to the truth-finding process and as fostering a
disregard for the fundamental principle that “the public . . . has a
right to every man’s evidence.”31
The utilitarian approach was adopted by two of the giants in Anglo-American evidence law, Jeremy Bentham and John Henry Wigmore.32 Utilitarianism is the ethical principle maintaining that an
action is right if it tends to maximize the happiness of everyone affected by the action.33 Thus, the utilitarian focus is on the consequences of an act rather than on the act’s intrinsic nature or the motives of the actor.34 Dean Wigmore was an empiricist who challenged the soundness of the deontological approach.35 He urged the
courts to strictly construe existing privileges and identified four conditions, which he believed were necessary, for the recognition of a
privilege:
29. Rex v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 572–73 (H.L.) (Eng.).
30. Id.; WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2286, at 531.
31. See WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527; see also United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
32. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.5, 141–46 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing
Bentham’s role in the transition to the modern privilege doctrine).
33. Utilitarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/620682/utilitarianism (last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
34. Id. Utilitarianism is a tradition originating from the eighteenth-andnineteenth-century English philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill and holds that “an action is right if it tends to promote happiness
and wrong if it tends to produce the reverse of happiness” for everyone affected by
the action. Id.; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789); JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher ed., 1979) (4th ed. 1871).
35. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527.
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(1) The communications must originate in a confidence
that they will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to
the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation.36
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted Wigmore’s test for the recognition of privileges, stating that privileges should be utilized “only
to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth.”37 The Court utilized this approach in recognizing the
importance of the attorney-client privilege in Swidler & Berlin, finding that “[t]he attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage ‘full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and the administration of justice,’”38 and the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in Jaffee.39
However, the utilitarian approach is not without its critics. Authors have challenged the behavioral assumptions underlying the
36. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2285, at 527 (emphases omitted). This oftquoted passage in Wigmore’s treatise has been viewed as the most important section in his volume dedicated to privileges. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, §3.2.3,
at 159.
37. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
38. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
39. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996) (finding that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was justified because the protection of confidential communications between a patient and her therapist advances considerably important
interests that outweigh the need for relevant evidence).
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instrumental rationale, disputing the contention that people would
refrain from consulting with attorneys or confiding in therapists
without the promise of confidentiality.40 As such, legal scholars
have questioned the soundness of employing the instrumental rationale to uphold a variety of communication privileges, including the
attorney-client privilege,41 the clergy-penitent privilege,42 the psychotherapist-patient privilege,43 and the spousal-communications
privilege.44 Additionally, exclusive reliance on the utilitarian model
for the recognition of privileges has been criticized on the grounds
that it is “too narrow and legalistic a basis on which to erect privilege doctrine.”45
More recently, the focus of some legal scholars has been on the
broader concept of human autonomy, the freedom to control one’s
own life and destiny, which has been defined as an ultimate moral
good in society.46 Similarly, other commentators have suggested
that the best arguments for the preservation of privileges are those
based on the instrumental rationales as well as rationales evolving
40. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral Assumption
Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U.
PITT. L. REV. 145 (2004).
41. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.1, at 300 (citing RICHARD O. LEMPERT
& STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 614 (1977)).
42. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5612, at 87–88 (1992) (noting that the instrumental case
for the clergy-penitent privilege is weak).
43. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.2, at 313–35 (giving a detailed presentation of the empirical studies dealing with the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
44. WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2332, at 643–44. Wigmore believed that there
was no convincing data that the spousal-communication privilege was necessary to
aid communication between spouses. Id.
45. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 5.2.3, at 335. Professor Edward Imwinkelried has developed and proposed a humanistic rationale for the recognition of
privileges derived from the constitutional right to autonomy. See id. § 5.2.3, at
335–38. Under his proposal, the positive theory of freedom is a normative proposition as contrasted with an empirical hypothesis, and his theory or rationale for
the recognition of privileges is tested by examining the theory’s consistency with
liberal democratic theory as opposed to subjecting it to experimentation and scientific examination. See id. § 5.2.3, at 338.
46. Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life
Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 1174–75 (1999).
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from considerations of privacy, loyalty, and human dignity.47 For
instance, in the attorney-client context, it is argued that communications ought to be protected from disclosure not only because the free
flow of information may be improved because of the privilege but
also because individuals should be entitled to have attorneys advise
them on legal matters without the fear that the information communicated can be revealed by means of a subpoena.48 Likewise, even
though communications between a therapist and her patient may be
enhanced by the existence of a privilege, the protection of these confidences should be justified on the basis that public disclosure of
these types of communications, even though needed to resolve a legal dispute, “would be repugnant to most of society.”49
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE
The historical foundation of psychotherapeutic confidentiality is
thought to be the Hippocratic Oath, which is not surprising given
psychiatry’s origin within the medical profession.50 The Hippocratic
Oath states in part: “Whatsoever I see or hear in the course of my
profession as well as outside my profession in my intercourse with
men, if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets.”51 The right of individuals to control the disclosure of personal medical information is
also closely tied to the notion of personal privacy that was first acknowledged as a legal concept in the United States at the end of the
nineteenth century.52
47. Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second Chance—Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 796 (2002).
48. Id.
49. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the constitutional right of privacy as a rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege, see Steven R. Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1980).
50. Howard B. Roback & Mary Shelton, Effects of Confidentiality Limitations on
the Psychotherapeutic Process, 4 J. PSYCHOTHERAPY PRAC. & RES. 185, 185
(1995).
51. Id.
52. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 43, 297 (4th ed. 2004). As initially conceived by Justice
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A. Early Recognition of the Privilege
In 1952, the Illinois Cook County Circuit Court became what
some believe to be the first U.S. court to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege.53 In Binder v. Ruvell,54 a prominent psychiatrist
and a hospital were summoned to produce the medical records of
Mrs. Binder, who was a recent patient at the hospital.55 The court
ruled that the information provided by a patient to a psychiatrist during psychotherapy sessions was protected from disclosure, even
though the State of Illinois, at the time, did not recognize a physician-patient privilege.56 In determining whether Illinois law should
recognize this new privilege, the court adopted the utilitarian approach and analyzed the psychotherapist-patient privilege in terms of
the elements expounded by Dean Wigmore.57 It concluded that the
protection of the confidences that arise in the psychotherapist-patient
relationship far outweighed the “correct disposal of a particular
case.”58
During the mid-to-late-1950s, the idea that therapy patients
might need unique legal protections took hold, and the concept of the

Brandeis, the right of privacy is “[t]he right to be left alone.” Louis D. Brandeis &
Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
While some have argued that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is protected by
the constitutional right to privacy, a liberty interest contained in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, these arguments have largely
been unsuccessful. Compare Bruce J. Winick, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence View, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249, 251–52 (1996)
(indicating the constitutional aspects of privilege as it relates to privacy), with
Smith, supra note 49, at 4. Additionally, Smith also argues that the First Amendment protects therapeutic communications since “autonomous control over the
development and expression of one’s intellect, interests, tastes, and personality”
are rights protected by the First Amendment. Smith, supra note 49, at 20 n.141
(quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (emphasis omitted).
53. See Binder v. Ruvell, No. 52C2535 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 24, 1952), available at
http://jaffee-redmond.org/cases/binder.htm.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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psychiatrist-patient privilege was actively debated.59 In 1960, the
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (“GAP”) issued a report
entitled Confidentiality and Privileged Communication in the Practice of Psychiatry, which included this frequently quoted passage
that articulated the need for the privilege:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to
maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is
completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to
talk freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to
function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication . . . . There
is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for
successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well
be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client.
Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients’ conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes
as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond
a patient’s awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.60
The State of Connecticut was the first state to enact a psychotherapist-patient privilege statute.61 The privilege applied in civil and
criminal cases and covered communications between patients and
psychotherapists.62 This Connecticut law ultimately formed the basis for the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent proposal for a psychotherapist-patient privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence.63
59. Paul W. Mosher, Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The History and Significance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in the Case of Jaffee v. Redmond
(1999)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://jaffeeredmond.org/articles/mosher.htm.
60. Id. (quoting GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY,
CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION IN THE PRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRY 92 (1960) [hereinafter GAP REPORT]) (emphases omitted).
61. Id. (citing Abraham S. Goldstein & Jay Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege:
The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 733, 733
(1962)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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B. The Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504
The proposed Federal Rules of Evidence submitted to Congress
in 1969 by the Supreme Court initially included provisions for the
recognition of nine federal privileges, including a psychotherapistpatient privilege, which was set forth in proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 504.64 The proposed rule protected confidential communi64. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183, 240–41 (1972). Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 504 reads:
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege [Not enacted.]
(a) Definitions.
(1) A ‘patient’ is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A ‘psychotherapist’ is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be,
while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional
condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certified
as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly
engaged.
(3) A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed
to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or interview, or persons reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are
participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the
psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his
mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself,
his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis or
treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members
of the patient’s family.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by
the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may
claim the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to
do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for hospitalization. There is no privilege under
this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of
diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.
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cations between patients and physicians or psychologists made for
the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of mental or emotional conditions.65 The rule contained three specific exceptions: There was no
privilege for communications made pursuant to proceedings to hospitalize a patient, for communications made in connection with
court-ordered psychiatric examinations, or for communications made
in connection with civil proceedings in which a patient introduced
his mental condition into the case.66 The committee did not include
an exception for dangerous patients.67 The omission was a delibe(2) Examination by order of judge. If the judge orders an examination of the mental or emotional condition of the patient, communications
made in the course thereof are not privileged under this rule with respect
to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the
judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule as to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after the
patient’s death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 241.
67. Id. at 241–42. The Advisory Committee Report provides:
The case for the privilege is convincingly stated in Report No. 45,
Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry 92 (1960):
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain
confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent
upon their willingness and ability to talk freely. This makes it difficult if
not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where
there may be exceptions to this general rule . . ., there is wide agreement
that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.
The relationship may well be likened to that of the priest-penitent or the
lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients’ conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well.
Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient’s awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely.
A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.
Id. (quoting GAP REPORT, supra note 60, at 92) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Later, the Advisory Committee Report goes on to say: “While many of the
statutes simply place the communications on the same basis as those between at-
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rate decision. The committee that drafted the Connecticut statute
believed that patients willing to express to their therapists their intentions to commit crimes were not likely to carry out their intentions;
rather, they were making pleas for help.68
torney and client, basic differences between the two relationships forbid resorting
to attorney-client save as a helpful point of departure.” Id. at 243 (citing Goldstein
& Katz, supra note 61, at 736; WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 2286 n.23, at 534–35)
(internal citation omitted).
The Advisory Committee also wrote:
Subdivision (d). The exceptions differ substantially from those of
the attorney-client privilege, as a result of the basic differences in the relationships. While it has been argued convincingly that the nature of the
psychotherapist-patient relationship demands complete security against
legally coerced disclosure in all circumstances, . . . the committee of psychiatrists and lawyers who drafted the Connecticut statute concluded that
in three instances the need for disclosure was sufficiently great to justify
the risk of possible impairment of the relationship . . . . These three exceptions are incorporated in the present rule.
(1) The interests of both patient and public call for a departure from
confidentiality in commitment proceedings. Since disclosure is authorized only when the psychotherapist determines that hospitalization is
needed, control over disclosure is placed largely in the hands of a person
in whom the patient has already manifested confidence. Hence damage
to the relationship is unlikely.
(2) In a court ordered examination, the relationship is likely to be an
arm’s length one, though not necessarily so. In any event, an exception is
necessary for the effective utilization of this important and growing procedure. The exception, it will be observed, deals with a court ordered examination rather than with a court appointed psychotherapist. Also, the
exception is effective only with respect to the particular purpose for
which the examination is ordered. The rule thus conforms with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4244 that no statement made by the accused in the
course of an examination into competency to stand trial is admissible on
the issue of guilt and of 42 U.S.C. § 3420 that a physician conducting an
examination in a drug addiction commitment proceeding is a competent
and compellable witness.
(3) By injecting his condition into litigation, the patient must be said
to waive the privilege, in fairness and to avoid abuses. Similar considerations prevail after the patient’s death.
Id. at 243–44 (internal citations omitted).
68. See id. at 233–34 (not listing a future-crime exception). The Proposed Rules
cited an article by the authors of the Connecticut statute:
It should be noted that our committee deliberately chose not to write a
‘future crime’ exception into the bill. Its members were persuaded that,
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In 1973, the proposed rules were submitted to Congress for approval.69 However, the proposed rules, particularly Article V, which
dealt with privileges, got caught up in the political crossfire arising
out of the Watergate scandal.70 Strong criticism was aimed at the
“broad scope of the proposed privileges for secrets of state and official information.”71 The fact that the proposed rules excluded
spousal communications from the marital privileges and called for
the elimination of the physician-patient privilege was also the subject of frequent attacks.72 Unable to resolve the controversies surrounding these proposed rules, Congress ultimately decided to eliminate all of the proposed privileges and to enact a single rule, Rule
501.73 Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts
of the United States in light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-

as a class, patients willing to express to psychiatrists their intention to
commit crime are not ordinarily likely to carry out that intention. Instead,
they are making a plea for help. The very making of such pleas affords
the psychiatrist his unique opportunity to work with patients in an attempt
to resolve their problems. Such resolutions would be impeded if patients
were unable to speak freely for fear of possible disclosure at a later date
in a legal proceeding.
Goldstein & Katz, supra note 61, at 738–39.
69. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach to Privileges Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive Antithesis, and the
Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REV. 511, 512 (1994).
70. Id. at 512–14.
71. Broun, supra note 47, at 777.
72. Id. at 776.
73. Imwinkelried, supra note 69, at 514.
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ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.74
Following Congress’s decision to enact Rule 501 in lieu of recognizing the specific privileges recommended by the Advisory
Committee, the federal courts reached differing opinions in deciding
whether to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege.75 However, the states did not share in this disagreement; by the time the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in Jaffee, statutes in each of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia had already recognized
the psychotherapist-patient privilege.76
C. A Therapist’s Ethical Duty of Confidentiality and the California
Supreme Court’s Decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
In keeping with the long-held belief that confidentiality is essential to the therapeutic relationship,77 the various mental health professions employ a code of ethics that imposes on its members a duty

74. FED. R. EVID. 501.
75. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1996).
76. Id. at 12 & n.11.
77. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 5, Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (No. 95-266), 1996 WL
2017 [hereinafter Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n] (citing 2 HAROLD
KAPLAN & BENJAMIN SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1775–77 (6th ed. 1995)). The American Psychoanalytic Association has stated
that analysis cannot proceed without the formation of a rational, trusting therapeutic alliance. Id. The threat that a therapist might reveal a patient’s most revealing
secrets in a court of law would “stand as a permanent obstacle to development of
the necessary degree of patient trust” and “would pose a significant, and for many
patients an insurmountable, barrier to effective treatment.” Id. (citing ROBERT
LANGS, THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 193 (1973)).
Similarly, the American Psychological Association has noted that the establishment of trust between the therapist and the patient “has been deemed so essential
by some that it has been argued that psychotherapy is rendered worthless in its
absence.” Brief for the Am. Psychol. Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 12, Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 (No. 95-266) (quoting Mark B. DeKraai & Bruce D.
Sales, Privileged Communications of Psychologists, 13 PROF. PSYCHOL. 372, 372
(1982)).
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to protect patients’ confidences.78 Even though the mental health
profession consistently and zealously advocated for confidentiality
as the cornerstone of successful treatment, courts and legislators began to craft exceptions to this ethical duty of confidentiality, which
required the disclosure of a patient’s confidential communications in
certain select situations. In 1976, in the landmark case Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California,79 the California Supreme
Court first articulated what has come to be known as the “Tarasoff
78. See, e.g., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Standard 4: Privacy and Confidentiality
(2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx. Some relevant
subsections of the American Psychological Association’s Code of Conduct are:
4.01 Maintaining Confidentiality
Psychologists have a primary obligation and take reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any
medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be
regulated by law or established by institutional rules or professional or
scientific relationship.
4.02 Discussing the Limits of Confidentiality
(a) Psychologists discuss with persons (including, to the extent feasible, persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent and
their legal representatives) and organizations with whom they establish a
scientific or professional relationship (1) the relevant limits of confidentiality and (2) the foreseeable uses of the information generated through
their psychological activities.
(b) Unless it is not feasible or is contraindicated, the discussion of
confidentiality occurs at the outset of the relationship and thereafter as
new circumstances may warrant.
....
4.05 Disclosures
(a) Psychologists may disclose confidential information with the appropriate consent of the organizational client, the individual client/patient,
or another legally authorized person on behalf of the client/patient unless
prohibited by law.
(b) Psychologists disclose confidential information without the consent of the individual only as mandated by law, or where permitted by
law for a valid purpose such as to (1) provide needed professional services; (2) obtain appropriate professional consultations; (3) protect the
client/patient, psychologist, or others from harm; or (4) obtain payment
for services from a client/patient, in which instance disclosure is limited
to the minimum that is necessary to achieve the purpose.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
79. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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duty,” which imposes a duty on therapists to protect third parties
from harm caused by their patients.80 In Tarasoff, Prosenjit Poddar,
a patient of Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed by the
University of California at Berkley, killed Tatiana Tarasoff on October 27, 1969.81 Two months prior to the murder, Poddar had confided to Moore his intention to kill Tarasoff.82 Dr. Moore immediately contacted the campus police, who briefly detained Poddar but
subsequently released him.83 Neither the campus police nor Dr.
Moore took further action.84
The California Supreme Court held, “[w]hen a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.”85 The court stated that this duty
could be accomplished in a variety of ways, including: warning the
“intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the danger,”
notifying the police, or taking “whatever other steps are reasonably
necessary under the circumstances.”86 Regarding Poddar and his
therapist, the court found that a “special relationship” existed between them, which gave rise to a duty on the part of the therapist to
use reasonable care to protect a threatened individual from danger
emanating from a patient’s mental illness.87 Concerns were raised in
amicus briefs filed by the American Psychiatric Association and other mental health societies that this duty would be unworkable because therapists cannot accurately predict when, or if, a patient will

80. Id. at 343–47.
81. Id. at 339. The facts stated are as alleged by Tarasoff’s parents. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 339–40.
84. Id. at 340.
85. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 340.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 344. The court likened the therapist-patient relationship and the interconnected duty to third persons to situations in which a doctor was found to have a
duty to warn family members of a patient’s contagious disease and other cases
where courts have found physicians liable to third parties for the doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose a contagious disease. Id.
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become violent.88 Although the court acknowledged the difficulty a
therapist would have in correctly forecasting a patient’s behavior, it
responded that a therapist “need only exercise ‘that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily possessed and exercised
by members of (that professional specialty) under similar circumstances.’”89
The Tarasoff decision prompted a swell of similar judicial decisions and statutory enactments throughout the states, such that, by
the time that Jaffee reached the U.S. Supreme Court, a majority of
states had followed Tarasoff in one form or another.90 It is with this
backdrop that the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in
Jaffee.
D. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Recognition of the PsychotherapistPatient Privilege: Jaffee v. Redmond
In Jaffee, seven members of the Supreme Court found that the
communications between a patient and her therapist were protected
from disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege.91 The case
involved Mary Lu Redmond, a police officer for the Village of
Hoffman Estates, Illinois, who shot and killed a young man while on
patrol duty.92 Following this incident, she received extensive therapy from a licensed clinical social worker.93 Carrie Jaffee, the administrator of the decedent’s estate, filed a civil rights action in federal
court against Redmond and the Village of Hoffman Estates, alleging
that the respondents had violated the decedent’s constitutional rights
by the use of excessive force.94

88. See Brief for the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n as Amici Curiae, Tarasoff, 551 P.2d
334 (S.F. No. 23042).
89. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 (quoting Bardessono v. Michels, 478 P.2d 480, 484
(Cal. 1970) and Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 397 P.2d 161, 172 (Cal. 1965)).
90. George C. Harris, The Dangerous Patient Exception to the PsychotherapistPatient Privilege: The “Tarasoff Duty” and the Jaffee Footnote, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 33, 47 (1999).
91. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
92. Id. at 4.
93. Id. at 3–5.
94. Id. at 5.
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During the pretrial discovery phase of the litigation, the petitioners sought access to the social worker’s notes of her sessions with
Redmond.95 The respondents objected to the request on the ground
that the information was protected by the psychotherapist-patient
privilege.96 Although the district court rejected that argument, neither Redmond nor her therapist complied with the order to disclose
the contents of the notes.97 At the close of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that the refusal to turn over the notes had no “legal
justification” and, therefore, the jury could presume that the contents
would have been detrimental to the defendants.98 The jury awarded
the petitioners $545,000 in damages.99 The Seventh Circuit, recognizing the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, reversed and remanded the case.100 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether “it is appropriate for federal courts to recognize a ‘psychotherapist privilege’ under Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.”101
The opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, begins by noting that
Rule 501 allows federal courts to recognize new privileges by interpreting “common law principles . . . in the light of reason and experience,” and that it directs the federal courts to “continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.”102 However, the
Court recognized the general principle limiting the recognition of
privileges, stating:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a
fundamental maxim that the public . . . has a right to every
man’s evidence. When we come to examine the various
claims of exemption, we start with the primary assumption
that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 5.
98. Id. at 5–6.
99. Id. at 6.
100. Jaffee v. Redmond, 51 F.3d 1346, 1358 (7th Cir. 1995), aff’d, 518 U.S. 1
(1996).
101. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 4.
102. Id. at 2.
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distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.103
The Court explained that exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified by a public good.104
Applying the utilitarian approach, the Court noted that deciding
whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege was justified required
that it determine whether the protection of confidential communications between a patient and her therapist advances considerably important interests, which outweigh the need for relevant evidence.105
The Court found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege does
advance important private and public interests.106 It also found that
private interests are served when the communications between a patient and her therapist are protected from involuntary disclosure because effective psychotherapy demands “an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”107 As
the Court explained, the “mere possibility” of disclosure of confidential communications could obstruct the development of the confidential relationship required for treatment to be successful.108 Thus, the
Court concluded that “[w]here there may be exceptions to this general rule . . ., there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine
qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.”109 The Court also
found that the protection of confidential communications between
patients and therapists serves important public interests because it
facilitates the provision of mental health services.110 It remarked:
“The mental health of our citizenry, no less than its physical health,
is a public good of transcendent importance.”111
103. Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 9–10.
106. Id. at 10.
107. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 10 (citing Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972) (Advisory Committee’s Notes)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
110. Id. at 11.
111. Id.
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Continuing its analysis, the Court weighed the public and private
interests served by the privilege against the value of the evidence
expected to be produced in the absence of a privilege.112 The Court
suggested that little valuable evidence would be produced in the absence of a privilege because patients would be hesitant to disclose
confidential information.113 It noted:
If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be
chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances
that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in
litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants such as petitioner seek access—for
example, admissions against interest by a party—is unlikely
to come into being. This unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore
serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been
spoken and privileged.114
In interpreting the “reason and experience” language of Rule
501, the Court explained that recognition of the privilege by all of
the states indicated that “reason and experience” support recognition
of the privilege in the federal courts.115 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court also relied on the fact that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was included among the nine privileges recommended in the
Advisory Committee’s proposed rules.116
The Court rejected the balancing test adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in which the court balanced the evidentiary need for the information against the privacy interests at stake.117 The Court noted:
Making the promise of confidentiality contingent upon a trial
judge’s later evaluation of the relative importance of the patient’s interests in privacy and the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege . . . . An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 11–12.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11–12.
Id.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 17.
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certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.118
Finally, although the Court refused to identify exceptions to the
privilege, as that issue was not implicated by the case, Justice Stevens hinted that the privilege might not apply in certain situations.119
He stated in footnote 19:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege,
we do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm
to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a
disclosure by the therapist.120
Less than two years after this decision, the Tenth Circuit was
called upon to delineate the contours of this privilege and to interpret
the import of this particular footnote.121

118. Id. at 17–18 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
119. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18.
120. Id. at 18 n.19. Justice Scalia dissented and was joined in part by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. See id. at 18–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He criticized the majority for
ignoring the “traditional judicial preference for the truth” and for “creating a privilege that is new, vast, and ill defined.” Id. at 19–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He
questioned whether the privilege truly serves personal interests and whether there
is a public benefit resulting from the privilege. Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
He asked:
When is it, one must wonder, that the psychotherapist came to play such
an indispensable role in the maintenance of the citizenry’s mental health?
For most of history, men and women have worked out their difficulties by
talking to, inter alios, parents, siblings, best friends and bartenders—none
of whom was awarded a privilege against testifying in court. Ask the average citizen: Would your mental health be more significantly impaired
by preventing you from seeing a psychotherapist, or by preventing you
from getting advice from your mom? I have little doubt what the answer
would be. Yet there is no mother-child privilege.
Id. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
121. See United States. v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 1998).
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IV. THE DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION TO THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
COURT DECISIONS
A. The Tenth Circuit: United States v. Glass
With United States v. Glass, the Tenth Circuit became the first
federal circuit court after Jaffee to examine whether federal courts
should recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.122 Glass involved a defendant, Archie Monroe
Glass, who was voluntarily admitted to the mental health unit at
Hillcrest Hospital in February 1996.123 During his stay, he told his
psychotherapist, Dr. Shantharam Darbe, that he “wanted to get in the
history books like Hinkley [sic] and wanted to shoot Bill Clinton and
Hilary [sic].”124 He was subsequently released from the hospital
after agreeing to participate in outpatient therapy and reside with his
father.125 However, ten days after his release, a nurse discovered
that he had left his father’s home.126 She contacted local law enforcement, which, in turn, contacted Secret Service agents.127 These
agents interviewed Dr. Darbe, who reported Glass’s statements.128
Glass was charged with knowingly and willfully threatening to kill
the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a).129
Glass moved to exclude Dr. Darbe’s statement on the ground that
it was protected from disclosure by the psychotherapist-patient pri-

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 1357.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357.
Id. at 1357.
Id. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) provides in relevant part:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the
mail or for delivery . . . any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States . . . or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (2006).
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vilege as set forth in Jaffee.130 The government argued that the
statement was not protected by the privilege because it fell within
the exception Justice Stevens set forth in footnote 19 of the Jaffee
opinion—where “a serious threat of harm to the patient or to others
can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.”131
The court of appeals agreed with this argument by the government. It found that footnote 19 did, in fact, suggest a dangerouspatient exception and identified the necessary criteria.132 However,
the court found that, based on the sparse record in the court below,
the evidence failed to demonstrate that the required criteria were
established.133 It remanded the case to the district court for factual
findings and a determination of whether Glass’s threat “was serious
when it was uttered and whether its disclosure was the only means of
averting harm to the President when the disclosure was made.”134
B. The Sixth Circuit: United States v. Hayes
In 2000, the Sixth Circuit was confronted with the same issue as
the Glass court in United States v. Hayes.135 In Hayes, the defendant, Roy Lee Hayes, an employee of the U.S. Postal Service, was
charged with threatening to murder a federal official in violation of
18 U.S.C. §115,136 as a result of disclosures he made during a therapy session.137 On February 9, 1998, Hayes sought treatment at the
Veterans Administration Mountain Home Hospital in Johnson City,

130. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1357.
131. Id. (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)).
132. Id. at 1359–60.
133. Id. at 1359.
134. Id. at 1360. There is no published record of the proceedings of the district
court on remand.
135. 227 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) provides in part:
Whoever . . . threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States
official . . . with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official . . . while engaged in the performance of official duties, or with intent
to retaliate against such official . . . on account of the performance of
official duties, shall be punished.
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006).
137. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 579–80.
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Tennessee.138 At his first therapy session with Dr. Dianne Hansen,
he expressed his desire to kill his supervisor, Veda Odle.139 He was
released from the hospital several days later but was hospitalized
again in late February, during which time he repeated his desire to
kill Odle.140
On March 10, 1998, Hayes went to the Veterans Center in Johnson City, where he met with James Edward Van Dyke, a social
worker at the center.141 During this session, Hayes again revealed
his desire to kill Odle.142 Van Dyke claimed that he advised Hayes
that he had a duty to warn Odle if he believed that Hayes posed a
serious threat to her.143 Van Dyke allowed Hayes to leave on the
condition that he return for a therapy session on March 31.144 During his follow-up session on March 31, Hayes “outlined in great detail” his plan to murder Odle.145 Although Van Dyke once again
allowed Hayes to leave, he reported these threats to Odle.146 When
Odle learned of Hayes’s threats, she immediately contacted the Postal Inspector, who filed a criminal complaint against Hayes.147
After a grand jury issued an indictment against him, Hayes
moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress the production of his
therapist’s records and to exclude Van Dyke from testifying on the
ground that the evidence was privileged.148 The district court ordered the suppression of Van Dyke’s testimony and Hayes’s medical
records and, soon thereafter, dismissed the case against him.149 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.150
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion by distinguishing the state
law Tarasoff duty-to-warn requirement from the psychotherapist138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 580.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hayes, 227 F.3d at 580.
Id.
Id. at 580.
Id.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581.
Hayes, 277 F.3d at 581.
Id. at 587.
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patient privilege.151 It noted the lack of connection between a therapist’s duty to notify a third person of a patient’s threat to harm him
and the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which serves to prohibit a
therapist from testifying about the threat in a subsequent prosecution
of the patient.152 The court explained that the “Tarasoff duty” serves
a more immediate function than the dangerous-patient exception and
further explained that the likelihood of the threat being carried out
greatly diminishes once court proceedings have begun.153 The court
commented on the paradox involved in cases like Hayes’s: Although
Hayes should be applauded for seeking therapy for his psychotic
delusions, he, instead, would become subject to criminal prosecution
when his therapists are required to testify against him.154
The court went on to examine the effect that a dangerous-patient
exception would have on the therapeutic relationship.155 It noted
that although warning a patient about a therapist’s duty to protect an
intended victim could have a “marginal effect” on a patient’s openness in therapy, warning a patient that his statements could be used
against him in criminal proceedings would “certainly chill and very
likely terminate open dialogue.”156 The court also opined that a therapist’s testimony in a criminal proceeding, which is used to convict
and incarcerate a patient, fails to serve the public’s interest in protecting third parties from threats posed by patients because incarceration diminishes the likelihood that a patient’s mental health will
improve.157
In addressing the questions raised by footnote 19 of the Jaffee
opinion, the Sixth Circuit found that Justice Stevens meant to assure
that the privilege would not operate to impede a therapist’s compliance with the duty to protect third persons from harm.158 The
court also found that Justice Stevens intended to recognize the need
151. Id. at 583.
152. Id. at 583–84.
153. Id. at 584.
154. Id.
155. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85.
156. Id. at 585 (citing Gregory B. Leong et al., The Psychotherapist as Witness for
the Prosecution: The Criminalization of Tarasoff, 8 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1011,
1014 (1992)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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for therapists to testify in certain court proceedings, such as those for
involuntary commitment of a patient, as part of their duty to protect
the patient or identifiable third persons.159
Finally, the court noted that the majority of states did not have a
dangerous-patient exception as part of their evidence jurisprudence
and that only California had a dangerous-patient exception contained
within its evidence code.160 The court also relied on the fact that the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence did not provide for a dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in reaching
its conclusion that “reason and experience” demonstrated that the
exception should not be part of the federal common law.161 It stated:
We hold, therefore, that the federal psychotherapist/patient privilege does not impede a psychotherapist’s
compliance with his professional and ethical duty to protect
innocent third parties, a duty which may require, among other things, disclosure to third parties or testimony at an involuntary hospitalization proceeding. Conversely, compliance
with the professional duty to protect does not imply a duty to
testify against a patient in criminal proceedings or in civil
proceedings other than directly related to the patient’s involuntary hospitalization, and such testimony is privileged and
inadmissable [sic] if a patient properly asserts the psychotherapist/patient privilege.162

159. Id.
160. Id. at 585–86.
161. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 586.
162. Id. In addition to arguing for a dangerous-patient exception, the government
made an alternative argument that Hayes’s continued threats, which were made
after Van Dyke informed him that he would need to disclose the threats to law
enforcement, constituted a waiver of the testimonial privilege. Id. The majority,
however, was unconvinced. Id. It noted: “It is one thing to inform a patient of the
‘duty to protect’; it is quite another to advise a patient that his ‘trusted’ confidant
may one day assist in procuring his conviction and incarceration.” Id. The court
found that since none of Hayes’s therapists had advised him that they might testify
against him, he could not have made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the privilege. Id. The court explained that for a valid waiver to occur, “a psychotherapist
must provide that patient with an explanation of the consequences of that waiver
suited to the unique needs of that patient.” Id. at 587.
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C. The Ninth Circuit: United States v. Chase
The Ninth Circuit was the third circuit court to address the dangerous-patient-exception issue. In United States v. Chase,163 defendant Steven Chase was charged with two counts of threatening federal law enforcement officers in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(1)(B).164 These threats were communicated to Dr. Kay Dieter on several occasions despite the fact that Dieter repeatedly
warned Chase that she had a duty to warn the intended victims of
these threats.165 Chase repeated these threats to two telephone operators at Dieter’s clinic.166 Dr. Dieter testified at trial, recounting
the therapy sessions in which Chase had threatened the federal
agents.167 The district court held that the testimony was admissible.168 It applied the test set forth in Glass and found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege did not apply.169 On appeal, the Ninth

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boggs argued that any barriers to testifying
against a patient are eliminated once a therapist informs a patient that their conversations will not be kept confidential. Id. at 588 (Boggs, J., dissenting). Boggs also
found that Hayes had waived any privilege when he continued to threaten Odle
after he had been informed that his threats would be reported, stating: “I object to
creating a barrier that prevents competent testimony as to the commission of a
crime by a fully warned patient from coming into court.” Id. at 589 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting).
163. 340 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
164. Id. at 979.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 980.
167. Id. at 981.
168. Id.
169. Chase, 340 F.3d at 981; see United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir.
1998). The district court held that the dangerous-patient exception applied because “Dr. Dieter had determined that Defendant’s threats were serious when uttered, that harm was imminent, and that the disclosure to authorities was the only
means of averting the threatened harm.” Chase, 340 F.3d at 981. The jury convicted Chase of the charges in connection with the threats made to the telephone
operators, but it acquitted him of the charges relating to the threats he made during
his therapy sessions. Id. The Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court’s decision because it found that the admission of Dieter’s testimony was harmless error since
the jury had acquitted Chase of the charges associated with those particular threats.
Id. at 993.
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Circuit found that the district court erred in recognizing the dangerous-patient exception and in admitting Dieter’s testimony.170
The Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy analysis of the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the dangerous-patient exception to
it.171 The court first found that even though Chase’s threats themselves constituted a crime, the statements remained confidential under Oregon law.172 It noted: “Once Defendant finished uttering the
threats, the charged crime was completed, and the psychiatrist was in
the same position she would have occupied had her patient described
a bank robbery in which he had participated a week earlier.”173
Next, the court discussed the Jaffee and Hayes decisions in
depth.174 Like the Hayes court, the Ninth Circuit drew a clear distinction between a therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality and the
testimonial privilege.175 It noted: “[A] state-law breach of psychotherapist-patient confidentiality would not necessarily lead to an abrogation of the federal testimonial privilege.”176 In a similar vein,
the court interpreted Jaffee’s footnote 19 to be the Supreme Court’s
indirect endorsement of a therapist’s duty to disclose threats to intended victims and the authorities.177
The court provided four reasons in support of its refusal to recognize a dangerous-patient exception.178 First, it found that crafting
a federal exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege would
undermine the confidentiality laws of the states located in the Ninth
Circuit because California was the only one of them to have recognized an evidentiary dangerous-patient exception.179
Second, the Court found little connection between a therapist’s
“Tarasoff duty” to report serious threats and the testimonial privilege, noting: “There is not necessarily a connection between the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Chase, 340 F.3d at 992–93.
Id. at 982–92.
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id. at 983–85.
Id. at 984–85.
Chase, 340 F.3d at 985 (emphases in original).
Id. at 984.
Id. at 985–92.
Id. at 985–86.
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goals of protection and proof.”180 Furthermore, the Court counseled
against conditioning a federal testimonial privilege on any state reporting laws because doing so would result in similarly situated patients facing different rules of evidence in the federal courts because
of the variations among the state reporting laws.181
Third, the court cited the fact that Proposed Rule of Evidence
504 did not include a dangerous-patient exception.182 The court
noted that because the Supreme Court recognized the privilege and
favorably cited to Proposed Rule 504, “the contents of the [Proposed
Rule] have considerable force and should be consulted when the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is invoked.”183
Finally, the Court addressed the public policy reasons supporting
the privilege and those in support of the exception.184 It concluded
that the benefits derived from refusing to recognize the exception far
outweighed any evidentiary gain resulting from the compelled testimony.185 It noted the “deleterious effect” that abrogation of the privilege would have on the therapeutic relationship and, in doing so,
quoted the Hayes court: “[I]f our Nation’s mental health is indeed as
valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we think it is, the
chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dangerous
patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first reason to
reject it.”186
180. Id. at 987.
181. Id. at 987–88.
182. Chase, 340 F.3d at 989.
183. Id. at 990 (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 504.02, at 504–07
1997) (footnote omitted)).
184. Id. at 990–92.
185. Id. at 990.
186. Id. at 990–91 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 584–85)
(2000)). In a concurring opinion, Judge Kleinfeld expressed that this case was
precisely the type of case described in footnote 19 of the Jaffee opinion, and therefore, the psychotherapist-patient privilege should not apply. Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld,
J., concurring). He reminded the majority that Jaffee involved only testimonial
privileges, not a therapist’s duty of confidentiality and further explained that because the issue of the “Tarasoff duty” to warn is a question of state tort law, it is
beyond the scope of Jaffee. Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). Judge Kleinfeld
also reminded the majority of the plain language of footnote 19, which states, “the
privilege must give way.” Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (citing Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)). He stated: “There is just no getting around
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D. The Fifth Circuit: United States v. Auster
The Fifth Circuit was confronted with the question of whether
the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege should be adopted in United States v. Auster.187 However, the
court did not decide the issue, but, rather, found that the privilege
itself did not exist because the defendant had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality.188
In Auster, defendant John Auster had, over the course of several
years, made numerous threats against certain individuals during
therapy sessions.189 His therapists had repeatedly informed him that
his threats would be reported.190 More importantly, his therapists
routinely reported these threats to his potential victims, and Auster
was aware that his potential victims were warned of his threats.191
The court found that Auster did not have a reasonable expectation of
confidentiality with respect to these threats and, on that basis, concluded that the threats were not privileged communications.192 Thus,
the proposition that Jaffee said, and meant, that the psychotherapist-patient ‘privilege must give way,’ referring to the privilege under Rule 501 to refuse to testify.”
Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1 at 18 n.19).
Judge Kleinfeld also expressed that a patient clearly waives the privilege
when he continues to communicate threats after being warned by the therapist that
his threats will be disclosed. Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). He also disagreed with the majority’s evaluation of the harm to the therapeutic relationship as
the result of a therapist’s disclosure. Id. at 997 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). Rather,
he found that the real damage to the relationship occurs at the point where the
therapist initially betrays the patient’s confidences. Id. (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
Furthermore, in cases where disclosure of a patient’s threats is necessary, he expressed that:
[T]he social interest in assuring that the judge and jury know the whole
truth greatly exceeds the value of preserving any remaining shreds of the
confidential therapeutic relationship. The jury ought, in such circumstances, to know the truth about what Chase said. The cat being already
out of the bag, trial is no occasion for stuffing it back in.
Id. at 998 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
187. 517 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2008).
188. Id. at 315.
189. Id. at 313.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 315–16.
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the court was able to resolve this case on these grounds and avoid
reaching a decision as to whether or not a dangerous-patient exception should be recognized.193

193. Auster, 517 F.3d at 321. Auster was a retired New Orleans police officer
who was receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Id. at 313. Drs. Fred Davis
and Harold Ginzburg were treating him for paranoia, anger, and depression. Id.
He was in treatment for several years and threatened numerous people during his
therapy sessions. Id.
The Fifth Circuit held that Auster’s communications to his therapists were not
privileged because Auster had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality, as his
therapists had repeatedly informed him that his threats would be communicated to
his targeted victims, and he was aware of numerous instances where these threats
were in fact reported to the potential victims. Id. at 315. The Fifth Circuit was
correct to reach this decision given the unusual facts of this case.
However, the Fifth Circuit did not stop there. It went on to perform a balancing test, finding that the “cost-benefit scales favor disclosure” in situations where a
patient has no reasonable expectation of confidentiality. Id. at 319. It also concluded that the benefit to therapy from protecting these communications from
disclosure at trial, while allowing the therapist to warn the threatened individuals,
is de minimus because the “atmosphere of confidence and trust” is severely undermined once the disclosure is made. Id. at 318. Conversely, the court found that
the increase in the admissibility of this type of probative evidence at trial serves
the public interest because of the important interests in the proper administration
of criminal trials. Id. at 318–19.
Although the court was correct to conclude that a confidential communication
is one that is not intended for disclosure to third persons, disclosure of confidential
communications does not, in and of itself, waive the privilege. MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, §5.6, at 352–54 (3d ed. 2003). The Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule of Evidence 512 suggest that a waiver of a privilege does not occur where a disclosure is made before the holder has a chance to
claim the privilege. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates,
56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1972). Additionally, many courts have found that if disclosure results from a breach of an ethical duty of confidentiality, the holder of the
privilege can nonetheless prevent the subsequent use in legal proceedings. See,
e.g., United States. v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 804–05 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing the
assertion of a privilege where evidence was improperly divulged by an attorney);
In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 468, 470 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(upholding a privilege even though the privileged information had been published
in a newspaper); Bryson v. Tillinghast, 749 P.2d 110, 112 (Okla. 1988) (privilege
can be asserted to block the testimony of a doctor at trial even though the information was disclosed by the doctor to the police and used as the basis for an arrest).
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V. THE CHASE AND HAYES CASES WERE CORRECTLY DECIDED
A. Footnote 19 and the Legislative History of Proposed Rule 504
1. Jaffee’s Footnote 19
The much-discussed footnote 19 in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Jaffee provides:
Although it would be premature to speculate about most future developments in the federal psychotherapist privilege,
we do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege must give way, for example, if a serious threat of harm
to the patient or others can be averted only by means of a
disclosure by the therapist.194
The courts that have dealt with this footnote have not only disagreed
over its meaning195 but have also disagreed as to the persuasive value that should be afforded to this dicta.196
194. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996).
195. In Auster, the Fifth Circuit noted that Jaffee’s footnote 19 “demonstrates that
the Court viewed the privilege as limited in scope.” Auster, 517 F.3d at 315 n.5.
Conversely, Judge Boggs, in his dissenting opinion in Hayes, stated: “[F]ootnote
19 in Jaffee at least indicated that the Supreme Court did not mean that the rule it
had laid down was absolute, with no opening for further consideration in light of
other circumstances.” United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2000)
(Boggs, J., dissenting).
196. Dictum has been defined as a “court’s stating of a legal principle more
broadly than is necessary to decide the case” or a “court’s discussion of points or
questions not raised by the record or its suggestion of rules not applicable in the
case at bar.” Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate
Non-Workplace Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 90 (2008) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 485 (8th ed. 2004)). Obiter dictum, translated as a remark by the
way, has been defined as a “judicial comment made while delivering a judicial
opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
precedential.” Id. at 90–91 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (8th ed.
2004)). Footnote 19 is clearly dictum: It suggests a rule that was not necessary to
the decision and, furthermore, identifies a situation (when a patient’s threats
present a serious threat of harm to others) that was not present in the case before
the Court. Jaffee was a § 1983 action in which the petitioners sought damages for
wrongful death resulting from a shooting incident involving Officer Redmond, and
the petitioners sought to compel the production of Redmond’s therapist’s notes
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The legal community has struggled to formulate a workable definition of dicta and to fashion a consistent approach to determining
the appropriate level of authority it should be afforded.197 Legal
theorists have long engaged in the dictum-holding debate.198 Early
commentators such as Karl Llewellyn advocated for a formalistic
approach to differentiating dicta from case holdings.199 Professor
Llewellyn proposed four rules that he believed form the foundation
of American case law procedure:
1. The court must decide the legal dispute that is before
it.
2. The court can decide nothing but the legal dispute before it.
3. All cases must be decided based on a rule of law of
general applicability (in the relevant state).
4. Everything, but everything, said in an opinion is to be
read and understood only in relation to the actual case before
the court.200
Accordingly, Professor Llewellyn believed that the holding of a case
must be a narrow proposition and anything that is not part of the
holding is dicta.201
from their therapy sessions following the incident. See supra notes 91–94 and
accompanying text.
197. See generally Taylor, supra note 196, at 77.
198. See id. at 97–100.
199. Id. at 97 (citing KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 14–
15 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989)).
200. Id. (quoting LLEWELLYN, supra note 199, at 14–15).
201. LLEWELLYN, supra note 199, at 14. If dicta has no precedential value, then
why do judges include it in opinions? Some theorize that statements a judge
makes while fully aware that they have no precedential value are made with some
hope that they will be persuasive. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2027 n.109 (1994) (“A lower court is . . . always free to treat
a higher court’s dicta as persuasive authority.”). These types of statements have
been said to be the classic forms of dicta. Id. at 2000. For an example of this type
of dicta, see Justice Scalia’s remarks in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621,
622–48 (1991). Others have speculated as to why the Supreme Court would include dicta in its opinions. One commentator has suggested that the Court might
want to indicate how it would likely resolve a particular question in the future and,
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Contemporary dicta doctrine is unsettled and far from clear.
Courts have not settled on a cohesive means of determining the persuasive value of dicta;202 judicial opinions vary widely with some
courts going so far as to treat some dicta as binding authority.203
However, the value that courts have assigned to dicta does appear to
be directly related to the depth of discussion and analysis the dicta
initially received.204 Professor Lisa Durham Taylor has described
the various gradations of dicta as a spectrum “with the left end comprised of the court’s offhand remarks and side comments, referred to
by some as obiter dicta, and the right end occupied by the court’s
reasoned conclusions about the law, often labeled judicial dicta or
considered dicta.”205 The First Circuit has noted: “[I]n evaluating
dicta, ‘[m]uch depends on the character of the dictum. Mere obiter
may be entitled to little weight, while a carefully considered statement . . ., though technically dictum, must carry great weight, and
may even . . . be regarded as conclusive.”206 The Supreme Court
appears to agree. It has noted that considered dicta, contrasted with
obiter dicta, has “capacity, though it be less than a decision, to tilt
the balanced mind toward submission and agreement.”207 Additionally, it has been said that obiter dicta or “passing statements unsupported by any authority or even extended discussion are entitled to

since the Court is only able to decide a small fraction of the cases brought before
it, providing the lower courts with this information can guide them in reaching the
decision that the Court itself might reach. Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by
Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV 151, 173–74 (2009).
202. See Taylor, supra note 196, at 106–07.
203. See id. at 107.
204. See id. at 106–07.
205. Id. at 93–94 (footnotes omitted).
206. Id. at 93 n.79 (citing McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1991) (quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (4th ed.
1983)).
207. Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52, 59 (1933). Justice Souter has commented:
“Sound judicial decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense’ of the issues in dispute, and a . . . rule announced sua sponte is
entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.”
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal
citation omitted).
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nothing but disregard.”208 One scholar has gone so far as to suggest
that these types of deliberate asides may violate the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.209
This confusion surrounding the proper treatment of dicta is illustrated in the federal courts’ opinions that have addressed footnote
19 of the Jaffee opinion. The Tenth Circuit, in Glass, treated this
dicta as decisive when it crafted a dangerous-patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege based solely upon the language
contained within the footnote, without ever addressing the question
of dicta.210 Judge Kleinfeld, concurring in Chase, opined that the
Supreme Court spoke to the issue of the dangerous-patient exception
in footnote 19 and, based on this interpretation, concluded that the
dangerous-patient exception was applicable.211 In doing so, he
noted:
We ordinarily treat Supreme Court dicta with ‘due deference’
even though they are not binding. Because we are to interpret those decisions ‘in the light of reason and experience,’ the
Supreme Court’s dictum should speak even more persuasively than usual, since, dictum or not, what the Court says reflects its ‘reason and experience.’212

208. Shannon, supra note 201, at 174.
209. Dorf, supra note 201, at 2006, 2009.
210. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth
Circuit held that the psychotherapist-patient privilege would not apply to threats
that are “serious when . . . uttered and . . . disclosure [is] the only means of averting harm.” Id. at 1360.
211. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 995 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring).
212. Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d
450, 453 (9th Cir. 1996). Referencing footnote 19, Judge Kleinfield concluded
that the “privilege of a psychotherapist to refuse to testify in federal court, or her
patient’s privilege to bar her testimony, does not exist ‘if a serious threat of harm
to the patient or to others can be averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.’ That is, when the serious threat occurred that could be averted only by
disclosure, the privilege died.” Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996)). However, it is interesting that in
another part of the opinion he remarks that the footnote “has the look of a footnote
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More recently, the District of Maine, in adopting the Glass test, concluded that the Tenth Circuit’s rationale was “persuasive . . . particularly given the Supreme Court’s footnote in Jaffee suggesting that
the privilege must give way to a serious threat of harm.”213
It is clear that the courts that have relied upon this footnote in
reaching their decisions, particularly the Tenth Circuit, which crafted
a dangerous-patient exception based entirely on this footnote, have
erred. They have assigned a significant level of persuasive value to
this footnote, which is nothing more than an offhand remark or side
comment. This footnote is wholly unsupported by any authority and
void of any reasoned analysis or conclusions about the law.214 As
such, it is the classic form of obiter dicta, and courts interpreting the
Jaffee opinion should give it little weight or, better still, simply disregard these comments.
2. The Legislative History of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence
504
In addition to the disagreement surrounding the persuasive value
of footnote 19, the federal circuit courts have also disagreed as to the
meaning of the footnote. The Tenth Circuit, in Glass, along with the
dissenting judges in Hayes and Judge Kleinfeld, concurring in
Chase, believed that the Supreme Court suggested it would be appropriate to recognize a dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in situations where a serious threat of
harm can only be prevented by a therapist’s disclosure.215 Conversely, the Hayes majority understood the footnote to recognize the need
for therapists to testify in certain court proceedings, such as those for
involuntary commitment proceedings, and found that Justice Stevens
meant to assure that the privilege would not impede upon a therapist’s compliance with the “Tarasoff duty.”216 Likewise, the Chase
added to avert a risk that someone in the majority perceived were the opinion published without it.” Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J, concurring).
213. United States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D. Me. 2009).
214. This issue was neither addressed in the parties’ briefs nor was raised during
oral argument.
215. Chase, 340 F.3d at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); United States v. Hayes,
227 F.3d 578, 588 (6th Cir. 2000) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360.
216. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 585–86.
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majority interpreted Jaffee’s footnote 19 to be the Supreme Court’s
indirect endorsement of a therapist’s duty to disclose threats to intended victims and found that the Court intended to extend the state
“Tarasoff duty” to psychotherapist-patient relationships to which
federal law would apply, such as psychological treatment by federally employed therapists at oversees government hospitals.217
In a strong concurring opinion in Chase, Judge Kleinfeld criticized the majority for its position.218 He chastised the majority for
ignoring the Court’s use of the word privilege, stating:
The words ‘the privilege must give way’ [within the footnote] do not mean that the right to out-of-court confidentiality must give way . . . . There is only one way to read the plain
English of the Jaffee footnote, and that is that the privilege of
a psychotherapist to refuse to testify in federal court, or her
patient’s privilege to bar her testimony, does not exist ‘if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or to others can be
averted only by means of a disclosure by the therapist.’219
However, Judge Kleinfeld’s conclusion is flawed. The footnote is
not unambiguous, as he suggests, because there is inconsistency
within the language of the footnote itself. Although the Court used
the word “privilege” (“we do not doubt that there are situations in
which the privilege must give way”), it also chose the word “disclosure,” rather than “testimony,” in the latter part of its sentence (“if a
serious threat of harm to the patient or others can be averted only by
means of a disclosure by the therapist”).220
To “disclose” means “[t]o bring into view by uncovering; to expose; to make known; . . . to free from secrecy.”221 “Testimony,” on
the other hand, is defined as “[e]vidence given by a competent witness under oath or affirmation; . . . [a] particular kind of evidence
217. Chase, 340 F.3d at 984 & 984 n.2.
218. Id. at 993–98 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
219. Id. at 995 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). Furthermore, Judge Kleinfeld reminded the majority that Jaffee dealt only with the testimonial privilege, not with
the question of the therapist’s authority to disclose threats to potential victims,
which is a matter of state law and, therefore, outside the scope of the Jaffee opinion. Id. at 996 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).
220. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 n.19 (1996) (emphases added).
221. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (5th ed. 1979).
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that comes to tribunal through live witnesses speaking under oath or
affirmation in presence of tribunal, judicial, or quasi-judicial.”222 If
the Court intended to refer only to the testimonial privilege, as suggested by Judge Kleinfeld, then it should have used the word “testimony” rather than “disclosure,” and the footnote would have read:
“[W]e do not doubt that there are situations in which the privilege
must give way . . . if a serious threat of harm to the patient or others
can be averted only by means of the testimony . . . by the therapist.”
On the other hand, it is possible, as the Chase majority noted, that
the Court intended to endorse a therapist’s duty to divulge threats to
intended victims.223 Hence, the Court’s use of the word “disclosure”
in the latter part of the sentence should be interpreted to mean that,
in attempting to protect innocent victims and comply with the “Tarasoff duty,” a therapist would, in fact, reveal or “disclose” a patient’s threat to the authorities or the potential victim.
In addition to the fact that footnote 19 is ambiguous, interpreting
it as endorsing the use of the dangerous-patient exception in a wide
variety of situations is wrong because this interpretation renders the
footnote inconsistent with the rest of the Jaffee opinion. One commentator has argued that “it is nonsensical to interpret a footnote in
dictum to stand for the proposition that a ‘dangerous patient exception’ should be recognized when it goes against the very core rationale for the privilege.”224 Additionally, it would be irrational for the
Jaffee Court to have endorsed a dangerous-patient exception given
the fact that it specifically noted its agreement with the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee’s Proposed Rule 504225 that purposefully rejected the exception.226
222. Id. at 1324.
223. Chase, 340 F.3d at 984.
224. Paul S. Appelbaum, Privilege in the Federal Courts: Should There Be a
“Dangerous Patient Exception”?, 59 L. & PSYCHIATRY 714, 715 (2008) (quoting
Anthony Parsio, Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: The Perils of Recognizing a “Dangerous-Patient Exception” in Criminal Trials, 41 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 623, 651 (2007)).
225. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
241 (1972).
226. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1996). In fact, the Court has treated
the Proposed Rules as instructive in other cases. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367–68 (1980).
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It is reasonable to believe, given the Court’s favorable recognition of Proposed Rule 504, that the Court intended to endorse one of
the exceptions that was specifically contained in Proposed Rule 504,
specifically the exception for involuntary hospitalization proceedings.227 This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the
“serious threat of harm to the patient or others” language used by
Justice Stevens in footnote 19 is comparable to the “[d]angerousness
to self or others” language that is incorporated in various forms into
the involuntary commitment statutes of nearly all jurisdictions and is
the most commonly used statutory element for involuntary inpatient
commitment.228
Those that disagree with this conclusion have suggested that the
Court could not have intended to limit the dangerous-patient exception to involuntary commitment proceedings since mental health
commitment proceedings are governed by state law and are held only in state courts.229 However, this position fails to consider the fact
that involuntary mental health commitment proceedings involving
Native American Indians are frequently conducted in tribal courts,230
many of which have adopted the federal rules of evidence.231 Fur227. Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183,
241 (1972). The exception provides: “There is no privilege under this rule for
communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for
mental illness, if the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization.” Id.
228. JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, CIVIL LAW HANDBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 145 (2001).
229. See Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 715 (arguing that because state law regulates commitment hearings, the Supreme Court could not have meant to regulate
them).
230. See Jay H. Shore et al., Telepsychiatry with Rural American Indians: Issues
in Civil Commitments, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 287, 294–95 (2009). Public Law No.
83-280 transferred “limited federal jurisdiction over Indian reservations to the
states of Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin.” Id. at
293. Other states, including Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Washington, subsequently passed legislation asserting jurisdiction in accordance with Public Law No. 280. Id. In these
states, civil commitment proceedings may be brought in either state court or tribal
court. Id. at 293–94. In those states without jurisdiction under Public Law No.
280, proceedings must be brought in tribal court. Id.
231. See, e.g., In re Amendment and Adoption of Supreme Court Rules and Procedures, Supreme Court of the Cherokee Nation, Appendix, Rule 103, at 21 (pro-
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ther, since many states have fashioned their rules of evidence based
on the federal rules, the decisions of federal courts that have interpreted these rules carry significant persuasive value in those states.
Therefore, in those tribal courts that have adopted the federal rules
and in the states that have adopted a privilege rule of evidence fashioned after Federal Rule 501, federal court decisions interpreting
this rule, particularly the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, are
highly persuasive authority.232
B. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits Employed the Correct Legal
Analysis
Two years after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Jaffee, it granted certiorari in Swidler & Berlin v. United States.233
In this case, the Court was asked to delineate the contours of the attorney-client privilege; specifically, it was asked to determine
whether the attorney-client privilege survived after the death of a
client.234 In deciding this issue, the Court employed the utilitarian
approach, as it had recently done in Jaffee.235 It weighed the interests served by the privilege against the public’s interest in the proper
administration of the judicial process and held that the privilege survived the death of the client.236
In this case, the decedent, Vincent Foster, was the Deputy White
House Counsel under President Bill Clinton.237 He met with James
Hamilton, a partner at the firm of Swidler & Berlin, on a Sunday
morning in the summer of 1993.238 Foster met with Hamilton in orviding that “[a]ll proceedings hereunder shall, so far as practicable, be conducted
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure unless
preempted within these rules”).
232. See, e.g., People v. Paasche, 525 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting agreement with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554 (1989), a case involving the crime-fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege).
233. 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998).
234. Id. at 402–03.
235. Id. at 409.
236. Id. at 410–11.
237. Id. at 401.
238. Id. at 401–02.
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der to obtain legal representation for matters involving congressional
and other investigations into the firings of employees from the White
House Travel Office.239 Hamilton took three pages of handwritten
notes during this meeting; nine days later, Foster committed suicide.240 In 1995, special prosecutor Kenneth Starr began an investigation into whether certain people had lied or obstructed justice in
the earlier investigations.241 In December 1995, at Starr’s request, a
federal grand jury issued subpoenas to Hamilton and Swidler & Berlin for Hamilton’s handwritten notes of his earlier meeting with Foster.242 The petitioners objected on the grounds of attorney-client
privilege and the work-product doctrine.243
In determining the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court compared the injury to the attorney-client relationship
caused by the disclosure of client communications to the benefit to
be gained from the correct disposal of litigation.244 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that the attorney-client privilege
is intended to “encourage ‘full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration of justice.’”245
Next, the Court cited Jaffee for the proposition that the loss of evidence resulting from the privilege would be minimal since, without
the privilege, it was unlikely that the patient would have made the
239. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 401–02.
240. Id.
241. Fred C. Zacharias, The Fallacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been
Eroded: Ramifications and Lessons for the Bar, 1999 PROF. LAW. 39, 47 (1999).
242. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 402.
243. Id. Because the Court found that the attorney-client privilege survived the
death of the client, it did not decide the work-product issue. Id. at 403 n.1. The
D.C. Circuit had ruled that the privilege was not absolute. In re Sealed Case, 124
F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It applied a balancing test and opined that the risk
of posthumous disclosure, limited to the criminal context, would have a minimal
chilling effect on client communications, whereas the cost of protecting these
communications after death was significant. Id. at 233. The court also found that
the uncertainty introduced by the balancing test was minor, given the fact that
several other exceptions to the attorney-client privilege exist. Id. at 234. It held
that there is a posthumous exception to the privilege for communications that are
of substantial importance in a criminal case. Id.
244. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403–10.
245. Id. at 403 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
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communication.246 The Court found this reasoning to apply with
equal force to the attorney-client relationship and concluded that,
absent the privilege’s posthumous application, it was unlikely that
the client would have made the disclosures to his attorney.247
Prosecutor Starr argued that an exception to the privilege should
be allowed in criminal cases.248 He suggested that this exception
would have minimal impact on the privilege if the disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications were restricted to information that would be of “substantial importance to a particular criminal
case.”249 The Court rejected this argument, noting that there was no
case authority for the proposition that a privilege should apply differently in civil and criminal cases.250 And, just as it had in Jaffee, the
Court rejected the use of a case-by-case balancing test, commenting:
“Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client
interests, even limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application. For just that reason, we
have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the
privilege.”251

246. Id. at 408 (citing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 12 (1996)).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 408–10.
249. Id. at 408.
250. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09.
251. Id. at 409. Finally, even though Justice Rehnquist expressed some concern
over the lack of empirical evidence to support the contention that a client will be
less likely to share confidences with his attorney if he knows that the information
will not remain privileged after his death, the Court nonetheless held that the attorney-client privilege survived the death of a client. Id. at 407. The Court stated:
[W]e think there are weighty reasons that counsel in favor of posthumous
application. Knowing that communications will remain confidential even
after death encourages the client to communicate fully and frankly with
counsel. While the fear of disclosure, and the consequent withholding of
information from counsel, may be reduced if disclosure is limited to
posthumous disclosure in a criminal context, it seems unreasonable to assume that it vanishes altogether. Clients may be concerned about reputation, civil liability, or possible harm to friends or family. Posthumous
disclosure of such communication may be as feared as disclosure during
the client’s lifetime.
Id.
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In deciding whether to recognize a dangerous-patient exception
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, both the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits followed the utilitarian approach that the Court employed in
Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin.252 As the Supreme Court did in Swidler
& Berlin, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits examined the public and private interests at stake in protecting a patient’s confidential communications and compared these interests to the benefits to be gained
from the correct disposal of litigation.253 The Sixth Circuit noted
that informing a patient that his statements could be used against him
in criminal proceedings would “certainly chill and very likely terminate open dialogue.”254 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the benefits accruing from protecting the privilege far outweigh any
evidentiary gain resulting from the compelled testimony.255 Quoting
the Sixth Circuit, it stated: “[I]f our Nation’s mental health is indeed
as valuable as the Supreme Court has indicated, and we think it is,
the chilling effect that would result from the recognition of a ‘dangerous patient’ exception and its logical consequences is the first
reason to reject it.”256
In contrast, the test adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Glass was a
case-by-case balancing test—the approach that was specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in both Jaffee and Swidler & Berlin.257
The Glass test allows the admission of confidential patient communications at trial if the court determines that both the threat was serious when made and that harm can only be averted by disclosure.258
The second prong of this test requires the court to evaluate and
weigh the evidence on a case-by-case basis and also requires that the
court find that the therapist’s testimony to be of considerable importance to the case.259 This is the identical method proposed by Prose252. See United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 992–93 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2000).
253. See Chase, 340 F.3d at 990–91; Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85.
254. Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85.
255. Chase, 340 F.3d at 990.
256. Id. at 990–91 (quoting Hayes, 227 F.3d at 584–85).
257. United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 1998); see Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998) (rejecting a balancing test); Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1996) (rejecting a balancing test).
258. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1359–60.
259. Id.
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cutor Starr in Swidler & Berlin, which was rejected by the Supreme
Court on the ground that balancing “the importance of the information [in a particular case] against client interests . . . introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege’s application. For just that reason, we have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours
of the privilege.”260
Furthermore, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits were correct in refusing to draw a distinction between criminal and civil cases.261 The
Supreme Court made it clear in Swidler & Berlin that there was no
authority for treating privileges one way in criminal cases and another way in civil cases.262 Although Swidler & Berlin involved the
attorney-client privilege, whereas the dangerous-patient exception
implicates the psychotherapist-patient privilege, this is a distinction
without a difference. These privileges should be afforded the same
treatment because similar policy reasons justify them. Confidentiality is necessary in both of these relationships to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and clients as well as between therapists and their patients in order to promote broader public
interests in the administration of justice and the mental health of this
country’s citizenry.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Reason and Experience
Requirement
1. The States’ Experience
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre260. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 409.
261. Concurring in Chase, Judge Kleinfeld would have required the therapist to
testify to threats made by the patient, stating: “As a percipient witness to a felony,
she ought to be required to testify to what she perceived.” Chase, 340 F.3d at 994.
Likewise, the dissent in Hayes seemed to find the fact that the case was a criminal
prosecution to be significant, noting: “[I]t is important to recognize that, if the
proffered evidence is believed, what occurred here was a crime.” Hayes, 227 F.3d
at 588. This distinction is also implicit in Glass, which was a criminal case. See
Glass, 133 F.3d at 1356.
262. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 408–09.
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scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience.263
In determining that “reason and experience”264 supported the recognition of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Jaffee Court took
note of the fact that the privilege was recognized in each of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia.265 However, because there is
considerable discrepancy among the states with respect to a therapist’s duty to third parties and little agreement regarding the dangerous-patient exception to the testimonial privilege, the experience of
the states does not provide a basis for recognizing a dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
It is important at this point to note the distinction between the
“Tarasoff duty” to protect and the dangerous-patient exception to the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. A therapist’s “Tarasoff duty” to
warn, or otherwise protect third parities from potential harm, is an
exception to a therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality and is enforced independently of the evidentiary rules of privilege.266 Privileges, on the other hand, protect only against compelled testimony in
legal proceedings.267 In some ways, ethical rules may provide more
protection than legal privileges because the duty of confidentiality is
not limited to judicial settings and applies to matters not covered by
privileges, such as non-confidential communications and secrets that
are not communications. Many mental health professionals believe
that absolute confidentiality can only be assured if an evidentiary
privilege applies alongside a professional duty of confidentiality,
because the fact that there is a professional ethical requirement of
confidentiality does not mean that an evidentiary privilege exists and
visa versa.268
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
ness

FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
Id.
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 6 (1996).
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.2.
Id.
In a jurisdiction that does not recognize a privilege, a person called as a witcan be compelled to disclose confidential information. In fact, most ethical
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Most states recognize an exception to the ethical duty of confidentiality in one form or another.269 There are, however, considerable variations among the states. The majority of states limit a therapist’s duty to protect potential victims to situations where the patient has made a serious threat to an identifiable individual.270 In
approximately half of the states, a therapist’s duty to warn of potential danger is mandatory; in others this duty is merely permissive.271
A few states impose no such duty at all.272
There is also disagreement among the states regarding the specific types of protective measures that a therapist is required to take.
The disarray among the states with respect to a therapist’s duty to
protect potential victims has been described as “virtually unprecedented for any widespread legal doctrine.”273 Some states impose on
a therapist only a duty to warn, whereas others require a therapist to
warn and take additional steps to protect the potential victim.274 For
example, a Colorado statute provides:
When there is a duty to warn and protect under the circumstances specified above, the duty shall be discharged by the
mental health care provider making reasonable and timely efforts to notify any person or persons specifically threatened,
as well as notifying an appropriate law enforcement agency
or by taking other appropriate action including, but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient.275

standards provide an exception to the confidentiality requirement when the disclosure is required by law. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Standard 4: Privacy and Confidentiality
(2002), available at http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx.
269. See Elisia Klinka, Note, It’s Been a Privilege: Advising Patients of the Tarasoff Duty and Its Legal Consequences for the Federal Psychotherapist-Patient
Privilege, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 885 (2009).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 885–86.
272. Id. at 886; see, e.g., Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 639 (Tex. 1999).
273. Klinka, supra note 269, at 886 (quoting Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A.
Young, Tarasoff at Twenty-Five, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 275, 280
(2002)).
274. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 160.
275. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-117 (West 2005 & Supp. 2010).
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The duty to protect is the majority rule, whereas the duty to warn is
the minority rule.276 Additionally, a few states, like California, have
created safe harbors for therapists whose patients have threatened
others during therapy sessions.277 In California, a therapist’s statutory duty is fulfilled when the psychotherapist “mak[es] reasonable
efforts to communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a
law enforcement agency.”278
There is similar disarray among the states with respect to the
recognition of the dangerous-patient exception to the testimonial
privilege.279 Much of this confusion stems from the legislatures’ and
the courts’ tendency to conflate the ethical duty of confidentiality
with the testimonial privilege. This confusion is also the result of
ambiguous statutes, which fail to make this distinction clear. Although California is the only state that includes a dangerous-patient
exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege as part of its evidence code,280 a few other jurisdictions have statutes that clearly appear to create an exception to the testimonial privilege.281 For example, a Wyoming statute entitled “Privileged communication” begins with the language “[i]n judicial proceedings” and prohibits a
therapist from disclosing confidential information except in a series
276. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 160.
277. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(b) (West 2007).
278. Id.
279. Some states apply a balancing test in determining whether to recognize the
privilege and allow disclosure of confidential communications if the information is
“sufficiently relevant to the proceeding . . . to outweigh the importance of maintaining confidentiality . . . .” Harris, supra note 90, at 41–42 & 42 n.45 (quoting
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1(b)(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
280. Id. at 43. The statute provides:
There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or property of another
and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2009).
281. Harris, supra note 90, at 42. Florida also appears to recognize this exception.
See Guerrier v. Florida, 811 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]he
Legislature intended to allow admission of the psychiatrist’s testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the dangerous patient for offenses committed against the
victim.”).

File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3

Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM

378 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM

Vol. 9, No. 3

of enumerated situations, including situations where “an immediate
threat of physical violence against a readily identifiable victim is
disclosed to the psychologist.”282 Likewise, Illinois provides for the
abrogation of the psychotherapist-patient privilege “in trials for homicide when the disclosure relates directly to the fact or immediate
circumstances of the homicide,” mental competency proceedings,
malpractice actions, and cases involving the validity of a will.283
Ohio allows “testimony” when a patient’s communications to his
therapist indicate a “clear and present danger to the client or other
persons.”284
282. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-27-123 (2009).
283. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/5 (West 2007).
284. Ohio’s statute specifically references testimony and states: “The following
persons shall not testify in certain respects . . . unless . . . the communication . . .
indicates clear and present danger to the client or other persons.” OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.02(G)(1) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2011). Other states appear to
draw the distinction between the disclosure of confidential communications and
testimony. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West 2000 & Supp.
2011). The Massachusetts statute provides:
[I]n any court proceeding . . . a patient shall have the privilege of refusing
to disclose, and of preventing a witness from disclosing, any communication, wherever made, between said patient and a psychotherapist . . . [except] [i]f a psychotherapist, in the course of his diagnosis or treatment of
the patient, determines that the patient is in need to treatment in a hospital
for mental or emotional illness or that there is a threat of imminently dangerous activity by the patient against himself or another person and on the
basis of such determination discloses such communication either for the
purpose of placing or retaining the patient in such hospital . . . or placing
the patient under arrest or under the supervision of law enforcement authorities.
Id.; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207(a) (2000) (“Neither the psychiatrist nor
any member of the staff may testify or be compelled to testify as to such [confidential] communications or otherwise reveal them in such proceedings without consent of the patient . . . .”) (emphasis added). The Tennessee statute allows for
three exceptions. Id. These exceptions are mental health proceedings, court ordered examinations, and where the patient has placed his emotional condition at
issue in a case. See id. § 24-1-207(a)(1)–(3). However, the statute also provides
that “[p]rivileged communications . . . may be disclosed without consent if . . . [a]
patient has made an actual threat to physically harm an identifiable victim or victims . . . .” Id. § 24-1-207(c)(1)(A). It also provides immunity for mental health
professions in certain circumstances: “No civil or criminal action shall be instituted, nor shall liability be imposed due to the disclosure of otherwise confidential
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Other states have statutes that address situations involving dangerous patients; however, it is not clear whether the required disclosure is intended to be an exception to the therapist’s ethical duty of
confidentiality or an exception to the testimonial privilege. For example, a West Virginia statute provides: “Confidential information
shall not be disclosed, except . . . [t]o protect against a clear and substantial danger of imminent injury by a patient . . . to himself or others.”285 A South Carolina statute entitled “Confidences of patients of
mental illness or emotional conditions” allows a therapist to “reveal . . . the intention of the patient to commit a crime or harm himself and the information necessary to prevent the crime or harm.”286
Connecticut’s statutory scheme exemplifies the confusion surrounding the distinction between a therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality and the testimonial privilege. One Connecticut statute is
entitled “Disclosure of privileged communications between marital
and family therapist and person consulting such therapist prohibited.
Exceptions.”287 It allows disclosure of “communications . . . [w]here
a marital and family therapist believes in good faith that the failure
to disclose such communications presents a clear and present danger
to the health or safety of any individual.”288 Even though the title of
the statute contains the word “privilege,” which would lead some to
conclude that the therapist could be compelled to testify against a
patient, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently held just the op-

communications . . . pursuant to this section.” Id. § 24-1-207(c)(2). This statute,
therefore, appears to allow a therapist to reveal a patient’s threats to the authorities
and potential victims and to provide immunity from liability as a result of the disclosure, while it also appears to prohibit a therapist from testifying about these
threats in criminal proceedings.
285. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1(b)(5) (LexisNexis 2008); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS SERV. § 333.18237 (LexisNexis 2008).
286. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-95(C)(3) (Supp. 2010). This statute is included
under Title 19 of the South Carolina statutes that is entitled “Evidence.” Id. However, there is no mention of judicial proceedings or testimony in the section whose
title is “Confidences of patients of mental illness or emotional conditions.” Id.
287. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146q (West 2005).
288. Id. § 52-146q(c)(2).
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posite.289 In 2009, the court interpreted a related statute to prohibit
in-court testimony by a social worker.290
In summary, it is clear that there is no consensus among the
states with respect to a therapist’s duty to protect potential victims,
and much confusion exists in the law regarding exceptions to a therapist’s duty of confidentiality and the dangerous-patient exception
to the testimonial privilege. Hence, the “reason and experience” of
the states operate against the recognition of this exception.
It has been suggested that because several exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege already exist, “reason and experience”
favor the recognition of the dangerous-patient exception to this privilege.291 It has also been argued that when other exceptions to a privilege exist, the impact of an additional exception is marginal.292 It
does appear that the trend amongst the states is to extend the psychotherapist-patient privilege to a wide variety of mental health professionals, while limiting its use through the creation of numerous exceptions.293 Currently, some twenty jurisdictions recognize the three
exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege contained in Proposed Rule 504 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,294 and virtually all
states recognize exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege
in cases involving child abuse and neglect.295 That being said, the
fact that the state law of privilege is riddled with exceptions and has
been described as a “crazy quilt pattern of legislation across the
289. See State v. Orr, 969 A.2d 750, 756 (Conn. 2009).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., B. Joseph Wadsworth, Evidence—Recognition of a Federal Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996), 32
LAND & WATER L. REV. 873, 880–81 (1997).
292. This was Kenneth Starr’s argument in Swidler & Berlin. See Swidler &
Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998).
293. Harriet L. Glosoff et al., Privileged Communication in the Counselor-Client
Relationship, 78 J. OF COUNSELING & DEV. 454, 455 (2000).
294. Karen L. Ross, Revealing Confidential Secrets: Will It Save Our Children?,
28 SETON HALL L. REV 963, 971 (1998). In these states, communications between
therapists and patients are not privileged if for court proceedings requiring hospitalization, communications during a court-ordered examination of the mental or
emotional condition of the patient, or communications when the mental or emotional condition of the patient is an element of a claim or defense. See Rules of
Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 240–41 (1972).
295. Glosoff et al., supra note 293, at 456; see also Paruch, supra note 11, at 537.
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country” is no justification for recognizing additional ones.296 In
fact, just the opposite is true. This was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin, where the Court stated: “A ‘no
harm in one more exception’ rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without reference to common-law principles or ‘reason and experience.’”297 Indeed, two years earlier in
Jaffee the Court stated: “An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”298
2. “Reason and Experience” – The Other Communication
Privileges
Determining whether the “reason and experience” requirement of
Rule 501 justifies the recognition of the dangerous-patient exception
to the psychotherapist-patient privilege should also require an examination and comparison of the other federal communication privileges, the rationale justifying these privileges, and the commonly
recognized exceptions to these privileges. The “reason and experience” requirement of Rule 501 should command consistent treatment of those privileges that are based on common rationales and are
296. Glosoff et al., supra note 293, at 455; see id. at 455–58 (providing a table
illustrating the exceptions to the privilege by state and the District of Columbia).
Many federal courts have recognized a patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege, which was provided for in the rejected Federal Rule of
Evidence 504(d)(3). Melissa L. Nelken, The Limits of Privilege: The Developing
Scope of Federal Psychotherapists-Patient Privilege Law, 20 REV. LITIG. 1, 19
(2000). The proposed rule crafted an exception for “communications relevant to
an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in
which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.” Rules
of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241 (1972).
The majority of federal cases interpreting Jaffee have involved this exception,
which arises most frequently in claims in civil cases for emotional distress, purportedly the result of the defendant’s conduct. Nelken, supra note 296, at 20–21; see
also Deirdre M. Smith, An Uncertain Privilege: Implied Waiver and the Evisceration of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in the Federal Courts, 58 DEPAUL L.
REV 79, 80 (2008). Professor Smith describes the psychotherapist-patient privilege as a “body of law in disarray” with inconsistent methods of enforcement,
sometimes within the same district. Id.
297. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 410.
298. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996).
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supported by comparable public policies, unless a compelling reason
exists to justify different treatment. Ensuring consistent treatment of
privileges provides certainty to the law of privileges and further
serves to promote the policies upon which they were created.
The following section presents a discussion of the commonly
recognized communication privileges, the underlying rationale supporting those privileges, and the generally recognized exceptions to
each of them. It demonstrates that although the attorney-client,
spousal-communication, clergy-penitent, and psychotherapist-patient
privileges all share a similar purpose—to prevent intrusion into certain select relationships and protect communications between the
parties in these relationships—neither the common law nor statutory
law has carved out an analogous exception to the dangerous-patient
exception for the attorney-client, spousal-communication, or clergypenitent privileges.
a. The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the confidential
communication privileges known to the common law.299 It was initially rooted in the notion of loyalty, based on a code of honor holding that to require a person to divulge a secret is itself a breach of a
moral duty and, thus, is wrong.300 McCormick has described the
rationale for the contemporary attorney-client privilege as resting on
three propositions.301 First, the complexity of modern day law requires that people have the assistance of attorneys in order to settle
their disputes and manage their affairs.302 The second proposition is
that attorneys will be unable to properly assist their clients unless
they are fully informed of the facts of the client’s situation.303 Third,
clients cannot be expected to provide their attorneys with all of the
facts without the assurance that the attorney cannot be compelled to
reveal these confidences in court.304 The U.S. Supreme Court has
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
Shuman, supra note 17, at 667.
BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 87, at 150–51.
Id.
Id.
Id.

File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3

2011

Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM

DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION

383

described the rationale supporting the attorney-client privilege as:
“The privilege is intended to encourage ‘full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and the administration of
justice.’”305
In addition to the privilege, attorney ethical rules also protect
communications between attorneys and clients, similar to the ethical
rules that protect communications between mental health professionals and their patients.306 Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
requires an attorney to protect “information relating to the representation of a client” unless the client consents to the disclosure.307 It
also allows disclosure in select circumstances, including the prevention of injury to the financial or property interests of others and controversies between an attorney and client.308 The Rule also contains
a dangerous-client exception, providing that: “A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”309 This rule is permissive: It
gives the attorney discretion to determine whether to disclose the
information.310 The comments to Rule 1.6 of the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct provide insight into the decision in favor of a
permissive, as opposed to a compulsory, disclosure rule:
[I]t is very difficult for a lawyer to ‘know’ when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the client may
have a change of mind. To require disclosure when the client
intends such an act, at the risk of professional discipline if the
assessment of the client’s purpose turns out to be wrong,
would be to impose a penal risk that might interfere with the
305. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 404 (1998) (quoting Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
306. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
307. Id. at R. 1.6(a).
308. Id. at R. 1.6(b).
309. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1).
310. An earlier version of the 1983 Model Rules would have made this disclosure
mandatory, however, it was changed after strong opposition was voiced to the
mandatory disclosure requirement.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE 281 (2009).

File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3

Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM

384 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM

Vol. 9, No. 3

lawyer’s resolution of an inherently difficult moral dilemma.311
Presently, every jurisdiction’s ethical rules contain a dangerousclient exception; some states allow an attorney to disclose client confidences while other states require disclosure by the attorney when
the attorney believes a client is likely to commit an act expected to
result in serious injury or death.312 At present, eleven states mandate
that an attorney reveal confidential information in order to prevent
the client from killing or inflicting serious bodily harm on a third
party.313 However, even with these mandatory reporting requirements, there is little empirical evidence demonstrating that attorneys
actually warn third parties of threats made by their clients.314 Moreover, there is no evidence that lawyers are actually disciplined for
failing to give such warnings; there are no reported disciplinary cases against attorneys for failing to warn under these circumstances.315
Furthermore, unlike the disclosure rules applicable to mental
health professionals, attorneys are not held liable in tort for injuries
to third parties caused by their clients because the common law of
tort has not extended the “Tarasoff duty” to attorneys.316 There are
no reported cases in which courts have held attorneys civilly liable
for the failure to warn third parties about a client’s dangerous intentions, and the few courts that have addressed this issue have held to
the contrary.317 It has been argued that no special relationship exists
311. MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2010). Although the Model
Rules limit the disclosure to situations involving death or serious bodily injury,
other states allow attorneys to disclose client information under more expansive
criteria. For example, the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct allow an attorney to reveal “the intention of a client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.” Id. at R. 1.6(c)(4).
312. See R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1627, 1679–80 (2003).
313. Davalene Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a
Lawyer Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client’s Threat to Cause Serious Physical Harm or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 479, 481 n.4 (2000).
314. Id. at 482.
315. Id. at 481.
316. Id. at 480.
317. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1683.
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between an attorney and a client, unlike that found to exist between a
patient and a therapist, principally because of the difficulty of determining the appropriate standard of care.318 Those advocating for this
position draw a distinction between therapists and attorneys on the
grounds that attorneys do not receive any special training in evaluating the seriousness and legitimacy of a client’s threats.319
However, this position assumes that mental health professionals
possess the skills that allow them to accurately predict behavior.
Yet, studies have shown the opposite to be true. It is suggested that
“[a]t best it would seem that clinicians can predict violent behavior
with an accuracy rate that is slightly better than chance.”320 After an
in-depth study of the empirical data in this area, one researcher has
concluded: “I do not believe that either the researcher or legal scholar has delivered very much that is really useful to frontline clinicians making violence risk assessments in the wide variety of settings in which these assessments are required.”321
Further, therapists often have difficulty determining if the dangerousness threshold is met and, therefore, if the “Tarasoff duty” is
invoked.322 But because of the law’s current emphasis on the duty to
318. See Cooper, supra note 313, at 503–04. Some authors have suggested that
the lack of training in predicting human behavior or evaluating the mental health
of a client is all the more reason for requiring mandatory reporting by attorneys of
threats made by their clients. See Deborah Abramovsky, A Case for Increased
Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43, 51 (1985). However, one empirical study
suggested that lawyers do not have difficulty evaluating the seriousness of threats
by a client to kill or seriously harm another person. See Leslie C. Levin, Testing
the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer Response to Clients Who Intend to
Harm Others, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 81, 114–17 (1994).
319. Cooper, supra note 313, at 503–04.
320. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 176. This is a serious issue that deserves meaningful discussion; however an in-depth analysis of this topic is beyond
the scope of this article. For a more complete discussion, see Christopher Slobogin, Involuntary Community Treatment of People Who Are Violent and Mentally
Ill: A Legal Analysis, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 685 (1994).
321. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 178 (citing Henry J. Steadman, From
Dangerousness to Risk Assessment of Community Violence: Taking Stock at the
Turn of the Century, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 269 (2000)).
322. This argument was made by the American Psychiatric Association in Tarasoff but was rejected without discussion by the California Supreme Court. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976). One commentator has noted: “The courts have had little difficulty in imposing liability through
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warn, therapists are more apt to err on the side of warning and will
often ignore other more effective clinical interventions.323
The other key argument that is advanced in support of not extending the “Tarasoff duty” to attorneys is that attorneys have a
“unique role” as advocates for their clients and that imposing duties
on attorneys to protect third parties would be “contrary to the clientcentered model of our adversarial system.”324 In fact, this argument
applies with equal force to mental health professionals who also
have a “unique role” as advocates for their patients.325 It is also contended that because attorneys have an ongoing role to play within the
legal system with respect to a client, “forced disclosure might drive a
wedge between the attorney and any client whom he continues to
represent.”326 Yet, this was the Jaffee Court’s precise justification
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege—the need to protect the
trust and confidentiality of the psychotherapist-patient relationship
which it found to be a “sine qua non for successful psychiatric
treatment.”327
Finally, although the rules of professional responsibility provide
for a dangerous-patient exception to the ethical duty of confidentiality, there is no recognized dangerous-person exception to the attorney-client testimonial privilege. The crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege is a close counterpart; however, there is a
significant distinction between these two exceptions. In order for the
crime-fraud exception to abrogate the attorney-client testimonial
privilege, it must be shown that the communications between the
attorney and the client were made in the furtherance of a crime or
hindsight analysis.” PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 184 (quoting ROBERT I.
SIMON, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 314 (2d ed. 1992)). It is also clear
that mental health professionals are uncomfortable dealing with the legal concept
of dangerousness, which is distinguishable from violence. Id. While dangerousness is a “legal status,” which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and judge to
judge, violence is a “social science concept and the primary subject when clinical
assessments are being made about dangerousness to others.” Id. at 175.
323. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 228, at 184.
324. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1683.
325. This is a key reason why mental health professionals have long advocated for
the right to protect the confidential communications of their patients. See id.
326. Id. at 1683 n.283.
327. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
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fraud and that the client sought the advice of the attorney to assist in
carrying out the crime or fraud.328 The Supreme Court has explained
that the purpose of the exception is to assure that the “seal of secrecy” between attorney and client does not protect communications
“made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a
fraud or crime.”329 Therefore, although an attorney may disclose (or,
in some states, must disclose) information about a dangerous client,
the attorney can be compelled to testify only if the client actually
sought the attorney’s assistance or advice in furtherance of the dangerous activity. This, of course, stands in stark contrast to the dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
where not only can therapists be compelled to testify about clients’
threats, but, in many instances, this testimony actually has been the
only evidence used to criminally convict a patient.330
b. The Marital Privileges
There are two generally recognized marital privileges: the spousal-testimonial privilege and the marital-communications privilege.
The testimonial privilege allows a witness to refuse to testify against
a spouse in a criminal proceeding and, in some jurisdictions, gives a
criminal defendant the right to prohibit a spouse from testifying
against him.331 The marital-communications privilege, which is rec328. BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 95, at 164–65.
329. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (quoting O’Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604 (P.C.)).
330. See, e.g., United States v. Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2009) (using a
therapist’s testimony to convict a defendant for threatening the President of the
United States).
331. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.31. This privilege evolved
from the common law doctrine that rendered a spouse incompetent to testify for or
against the other spouse. Id. This spousal disqualification originated from two
cannons of medieval jurisprudence: the rule that a party is ineligible to testify on
his own behalf because of his interest in the proceedings and the legal fiction that a
wife and her husband are the same person. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 44 (1980). The rationale for the testimonial privilege is to preserve the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. Id. at 52. Up until the Supreme
Court’s 1980 decision in Trammel, both spouses held the testimonial privilege in
federal courts. Id. at 53. In Trammel, the Court altered this long standing rule,
holding that the testimonial privilege vests solely in the testifying spouse. Id. In
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ognized in federal courts and in nearly all of the states,332 prevents
the compelled disclosure of “information privately disclosed between husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relationship.”333 The rationale for this privilege is the desire to protect the
trust and privacy of the spousal relationship and allow spouses to
communicate freely and in confidence with each other.334
There are only a few well-recognized exceptions to the marital
privileges. The first commonly recognized exception to these privileges arises in proceedings where one spouse is charged with a tort
or crime against the other spouse or a child of either, or against the
property of the other spouse.335 Another frequently recognized exception arises in actions by one spouse against the other,336 which
occurs most frequently in divorce proceedings.337 Finally, the jointparticipant exception, recognized by virtually all of the federal circuit courts but not all of the states, is an exception to the maritalcommunications privilege for ongoing or future crimes.338 However,
in order for this exception to abrogate the marital-communications
privilege, it must be demonstrated that both spouses were participants in a crime, or actively involved in planning a crime, at the time
of the communication.339 The common law “Tarasoff duty” to warn
or protect third parties from potential harm by a spouse does not apso holding, it noted “[t]he ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have
long since disappeared” and the contemporary justifications (preserving marital
harmony) are “unpersuasive” when the witness is willing to testify against the
spouse. Id. at 52.
332. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 12, § 5.32.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2162(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2008).
The Michigan statute states:
The spousal privileges . . . and the confidential communications privilege
. . . do not apply in any of the following: . . . (d) In a cause of action that
grows out of a personal wrong or injury done by one to the other or that
grows out of the refusal or neglect to furnish the spouse or children with
suitable support.
Id.
336. BROUN ET AL., supra note 14, § 84, at 146–47.
337. Id.
338. See id.
339. See id.
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ply and there is no equivalent dangerous-person exception to this
privilege.
c. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege
The clergy-penitent privilege is more closely aligned to the psychotherapist-patient privilege than the other two communication privileges addressed above because it protects disclosures made in connection with professional, spiritual, and personal counseling that
frequently involves deeply personal and intensely emotional matters.
The clergy-penitent privilege is recognized in every state by statute and at common law in federal court.340 The statutory form of
the privilege varies widely among the states but generally serves to
protect communications made in confidence to a clergyman in his or
her professional or spiritual capacity.341 Although the states are split
as to who holds the privilege, the majority of states assign the privilege to the parishioner.342
This privilege is the least defensible under the utilitarian approach.343 If the penitent believes strongly in the need to confess,
the utilitarian case for this privilege becomes critically weak, since
the communications between the clergyman and the penitent are
likely to be made irrespective of the presence of the privilege.344
Therefore, the rationale for this privilege appears to be grounded in
privacy concerns rather than the utilitarian principles that seem to
provide the foundation for the other communication privileges. This
privilege is “based in part upon the idea that the human being does
sometimes have need of a place of penitence and confession and spiritual discipline. When any person enters that secret chamber, this
closes the door upon him, and civil authority turns away its ear.”345
This privilege is also unique in that it has been defined broadly
by legislatures and interpreted broadly by courts, some suggest, out
340. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.3, at 525. The U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledges this privilege. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51
(1980).
341. See Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1630.
342. Id. at 1650.
343. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.3, at 529.
344. Id.
345. Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 161 N.W. 290, 294 (Iowa 1917).
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of fear that a narrow interpretation might interfere with religious
freedom.346 There are virtually no exceptions to the privilege.
Moreover, courts have consistently refused to impose tort liability on
members of the clergy as a result of their failure to warn third parties
of a parishioner’s dangerous plans.347
Even in the area of mandated reporting of child abuse and neglect,348 only thirty-two states include clergy in their list of mandated
reporters.349 And in fifteen of these states, the privilege survives the
duty to report.350 In other words, the duty to report does not apply to
information obtained in the confidential religious counseling setting.351 Furthermore, although ten states have mandatory reporting
statutes that indicate that the clergy-penitent privilege is “abrogated”
in cases of child abuse and neglect, it remains unclear whether the
duty to report would also require the clergy member to testify in subsequent legal proceedings.352 In Wyoming, for example, clergy are
required to report suspected cases of child abuse irrespective of the
source of the information; however, they are not required to testify in
later proceedings.353
The objective of the law with respect to the communication privileges is the protection of confidential communications within selected relationships in order to advance important social policy
goals. In the attorney-client relationship, confidentiality serves to
promote “the observance of the law and the administration of jus346. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1673.
347. Id. at 1685.
348. Mandated reporting statutes generally require that professionals with frequent contact with children to report suspected cases of abuse or neglect to the
state Department of Social Services. Id. at 1667. These statutes also provide the
reporter with immunity from civil liability for reporting suspected cases and carry
misdemeanor criminal penalties for failure to report when required to do so. Id.
349. Id. at 1668.
350. Id. at 1669.
351. Id.
352. Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1670.
353. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-210 (2009). In nine other states, clergy have a duty
to report irrespective of the source of the information and can be compelled to
testify in subsequent proceedings. See Cassidy, supra note 312, at 1670–71 &
n.226. The author notes that, notwithstanding the wording of these statutes,
whether a court would deny an assertion of the clergy-penitent privilege in a judicial proceeding is open to debate. Id. at 1670.
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tice.”354 The marital-communications privilege serves to “foster marital relationships by encouraging communications.”355 And while
the clergy-penitent privilege may serve to protect free exercise of
religion, it principally serves to protect an individual’s right to privacy.356
The social policy goal served by the psychotherapist-patient privilege—improving the mental health of the citizenry—is equally as
important as the policies served by the other privileges addressed
above. Moreover, protecting the confidential relationship between a
therapist and patient is the cornerstone to achieving this goal. All of
the major psychotherapeutic theories indicate that successful therapy
outcomes are dependent upon the relationship between the therapist
and the patient.357 The American Psychoanalytic Association believes that analysis cannot proceed without the formation of a trusting therapeutic alliance.358 The threat that a therapist might reveal a
patient’s most revealing secrets in a court of law would “stand as a
permanent obstacle to development of the necessary degree of pa-

354. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
355. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.2.1, at 507.
356. Id. § 6.2.3(b), at 529–530.
357. See Patricia Honea-Boles & Jean E. Griffin, The Court Mandated Client:
Does Limiting Confidentiality Preclude a Therapeutic Encounter?, 29 TEX.
COUNSELING ASS’N J. 149, 150 (2001) (citing Charles J. Gelso & Jean A. Carter,
Components of the Psychotherapy Relationship: Their Interaction and Unfolding
During Treatment, 41 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 296 (1994)). The therapists’
warmth or acceptance and empathic resonance are positively correlated with therapeutic outcome. Id. (citing D.E. Orlinsky & K.I. Howard, Process and Outcome
in Psychotherapy, in MICHAEL J. LAMBERT, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND
BEHAVIOR CHANGE 311–81 (S.L. Garfield & A.E. Bergin eds., 5th ed. 2004)). A
therapist’s unconditional regard for the patient allows for therapeutic change. Id.
(citing Carl R. Rogers, The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic
Personality Change, 21 J. CONSULTING PSYCH. 95 (1957)). A strong working
alliance has been demonstrated to result in positive outcomes and is viewed as the
most fundamental factor of the therapeutic relationship. Alliance is viewed as
consisting of three components: an agreement on the goals of the relationship, an
agreement on the tasks, and the development of an intimate bond between the
parties with trust at the center. Id. at 151 (citing Edward S. Bordin, The Generalizability of the Psychoanalytic Concept of the Working Alliance, 16
PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RES. & PRAC. 252, 252–59 (1979)).
358. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 5.
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tient trust,” which would pose “an insurmountable[] barrier to effective treatment.”359
Moreover, like the clergy-penitent privilege, protecting the confidentiality of the therapist-patient relationship is justified on humanistic grounds, originating from an individual’s right to privacy.
This right to privacy plays a central role in the therapeutic environment because full disclosure is an essential component of psychoanalytic therapy, which assumes that conscious thoughts and feelings
are caused by unconscious factors.360 Anna Freud has noted: “Confidentiality of the material . . . is a prerequisite for free association.
No [patient] succeeds in divesting himself of all defenses or controls
unless he can be certain that the derivatives of his id will not become
known beyond the confines of the analytic situation.”361 The disclosure of this private personality, although necessary for successful
treatment, could be “devastating if revealed to ordinary scrutiny.”362
Finally, given the social stigma that remains attached to psychotherapy, the mere disclosure that an individual is in therapy could be
detrimental.363
Thus, there are ample reasons that justify protection of confidential therapist-patient communications, just as there are with the other
communication privileges. However, only this privilege is subject to
abrogation by a dangerous-patient/person exception, requiring a
once-trusted confidant to testify in criminal proceedings against a
359. Id. Countless others have expressed the need for trust and openness in the
therapeutic relationship for which confidentiality is the cornerstone. See HoneaBoles & Griffin, supra note 357, at 150. Honea-Boles and Griffin present numerous other works and studies which support the proposition that the stronger the
therapeutic relationship, the more beneficial the therapy to the patient. See id.
360. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 7–8. It is through
full disclosure and the process known as “free association” that the therapist and
patient can successfully bring unconscious material “into the light of consciousness.” Id. at 9.
361. Id. at 11 (quoting ANNA FREUD, THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD 417
(1968)).
362. Ralph Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE L. REV. 175, 194 (1960). The establishment of a psychotherapist-patient
privilege is necessary because, in a psychotherapeutic situation, treatment is directed towards feelings and attitudes that are unacceptable to the patient and to
society. Id. at 194–95.
363. Brief for the Am. Psychoanalytic Ass’n, supra note 77, at 4.
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patient and allowing statements made within the confines of this
confidential relationship to provide all the evidence that may be
needed by the prosecution for a criminal conviction. Thus, “reason
and experience,” determined by comparison to these other communication privileges, do not support the recognition of a federal dangerous-patient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.
VI. CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING ABROGATION OF THE PRIVILEGE
A. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege Should Be Abrogated
Only In Certain Narrowly Prescribed Circumstances
Many judges and legal scholars have taken the position that the
dangerous-patient exception, as set forth by the Glass court, should
not apply in criminal trials.364 They believe that testimony by a therapist in a criminal trial, as to threats made by a patient in therapy,
does not fulfill the criteria set forth in the Jaffee footnote.365 They
argue that this type of evidence cannot serve to avert harm because
the criminal proceedings take place long after the threats were made
and because the sole purpose of any criminal proceeding is to punish
the defendant for his prior acts.366 Nonetheless, many patients have
been charged with crimes based solely on threats they made during
therapy sessions.367 Indeed, all of the federal circuit court cases that
have addressed the dangerous-patient exception were criminal cases
where the proceedings originated from a therapist’s report.368 In
these cases, the defendants were charged with violations of federal
statutes that criminalize threats against federal officials or employees, and, in these cases, the therapist was the key witness, and
sometimes the only witness, for the prosecution.
Another concern that arises from using the Glass test as the criteria for defining the dangerous-patient exception is the level of intrusion into the therapist-patient relationship and the amount of disclo364. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000).
365. See id.
366. See id.
367. Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 716.
368. United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 991–92 (9th Cir. 2003); Hayes, 227
F.3d at 586; United States v. Glass, 133 F.3d 1356, 1360 (10th Cir. 1998).
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sure of patient confidences that occurs as a result. This particular
concern was initially addressed by the California Supreme Court in
Tarasoff.369 In this case, the court recognized the importance of limiting the amount of disclosure of patients’ confidences, stating:
“[T]he therapist’s obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion
that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent
compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger.”370
However, when a therapist is compelled to testify against a patient in an adversarial proceeding, such as a criminal trial, preserving
the privacy of the patient is impossible. Envision a situation where a
patient threatens an identifiable third person during a therapy session. Assume that the therapist believes his patient poses a serious
threat of harm and, in accordance with the “Tarasoff duty,” reports
these threats to the authorities. If the patient is subsequently charged
with a crime, the therapist will most likely be called to testify at the
criminal trial. If the therapist testifies that he believed his patient’s
threats were serious, the first prong of the Glass test, which requires
a finding that the threat was “serious when it was uttered,” is met.371
However, any challenge to the therapist’s testimony would necessitate defense counsel’s inquiry into the reasons supporting the therapist’s belief that the threats were serious. In doing so, defense counsel
opens the door to the disclosure of vast amounts of potentially highly
prejudicial information, which otherwise would have remained privileged.
Because of the significant problems that arise when a therapist is
compelled to testify against a patient, this testimony should only be
required in certain, select situations. One author has suggested that
the privilege should only be abrogated if the patient presents a serious threat of harm to himself or others and the disclosure by the
psychotherapist will substantially advance the mental health interests
369. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976).
370. Id.
371. Glass, 133 F.3d at 1360. Under the objective test, a threat is considered
serious when the threat “can reasonably be interpreted as a serious expression of
intent to harm or assault the target.” United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007,
1018 (9th Cir. 2005).
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of the patient.372 This approach would eliminate the second prong of
the Glass test—the criterion that harm can be averted only by means
of disclosure—and the confusion that arises when courts conflate the
testimonial privilege with the “Tarasoff duty” to warn. Limiting a
therapist’s testimony to situations where the patient’s mental health
would be served would appear to restrict this testimony to mental
health commitment proceedings and, therefore, would not place a
therapist in the compromising position of being a prosecutorial witness.
It may be argued that even in this type of situation the therapistpatient relationship will suffer because the patient will perceive the
therapist’s testimony as being against his interests. However, in
commitment proceedings, a therapist retains the role as the patient’s
advocate and is there to recommend a course of action that will serve
the patient’s best interests. Furthermore, although involuntary commitment does involve a loss of freedom, there is a significant difference between punishment in the form of a prison sentence and the
loss of freedom that results from involuntary hospitalization.
Other scholars have identified additional circumstances in which
this type of testimony might be appropriate. Professor George Harris, who has advocated for the compelled testimony of therapists at
civil commitment proceedings, has also suggested that a therapist’s
testimony might be appropriate in proceedings to secure restraining
orders.373 He sees this type of proceeding as a necessary outgrowth
of a therapist’s “Tarasoff duty” to protect potential victims from
harm.374
Dr. Paul Appelbaum has suggested that, in spite of the harm resulting from the compelled testimony of therapists at a patient’s
criminal trial, there may be occasions when this testimony may actually be the only means of averting harm.375 Sometimes commitment proceedings or restraining orders are not enough to protect potential victims. Appelbaum believes this can occur when patients
who pose long-term threats to other persons do not qualify for acute
372. Daniel M. Buroker, Note, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege and PostJaffee Confusion, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2004).
373. Harris, supra note 90, at 33.
374. Id. at 63.
375. Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 714–16.

File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3

Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM

396 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW

Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM

Vol. 9, No. 3

hospitalization, or because involuntarily committed patients may be
released much sooner than they would be if they were imprisoned.376
He argues that in these types of situations, incarceration may be the
only means of protecting a potential victim and the testimony of a
therapist could be essential to achieving this end.377 However, Appelbaum cautions that unless the line can be held, it would be preferable not to abrogate the privilege with respect to dangerous patients
“lest the exception overwhelm the general rule that patients’ communications in therapy are deserving of protection.”378
However, even in the type of situation Appelbaum describes, a
therapist’s testimony may not be the only means of averting harm
because, oftentimes, evidence of a patient’s threats is available from
other, non-privileged sources. In fact, a troubling aspect of the cases
in which patients are prosecuted for threats made during therapy is
that the government appears all too quick to subpoena the therapist
and base its case principally on this testimonial evidence, while other
means of proving a defendant’s threats may be readily available. It
is unlikely that an individual threatening the life of another person
would only make these types of threatening statements during therapy. It is far more likely that this person has communicated his
threats to other individuals who can be produced to testify at trial.
Even though Dr. Appelbaum has identified the circumstances
under which he would allow the testimony of therapists at criminal
trials, he has expressed concern that the most troubling aspect of the
dangerous-patient exception is its “vulnerability to being used expansively for purposes beyond those originally envisioned.”379 Indeed, one needs look no further than California for evidence of a
court’s inability to hold this line.380 California, which has enacted a
dangerous-patient exception into its evidence code, is a prime example of how this exception has swallowed the privilege.
California Evidence Code §1024 provides:

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 716.
Id.
See, e.g., People v. Wharton, 809 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991).
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There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist
has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such
mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself
or to the person or property of another and that disclosure of
the communication is necessary to prevent the threatened
danger.381
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute in People v.
Wharton and held that the privilege itself never comes into existence
if the statutory conditions are met.382 It noted: “[I]f a certain factual
predicate exists (i.e., if the therapist believes the patient is a danger
to another and disclosure is necessary to prevent the danger), the
statute does not provide that the privilege is ‘waived’; it merely provides that ‘[t]here is no privilege.’”383 As a result of this interpretation, therapists in California have been compelled to testify in a wide
variety of circumstances, well beyond situations where disclosure is
“necessary to prevent the threatened danger.”384 Therapists are routinely required to testify in criminal proceedings and at death penalty
hearings about threats made by their patients as proof of premeditation. Still other situations have been reported where entire therapy
sessions have been stripped of their confidentiality once a threat was
made.385
A recent district court decision from the District of Maine, United States v. Hardy,386 further illustrates how easily these confidential
communications can be stripped of their privileged status.387 In
Hardy, the defendant entered an emergency room of a medical center in May 2008.388 In the process of admission, he threatened to kill
President Bush.389 He was transferred to another hospital for a psy381. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 2009).
382. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 347. The holding was reaffirmed a year later. See
Menendez v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992).
383. Wharton, 809 P.2d at 312. The court also held that confidential communications lose their privileged status once they have been disclosed to third parties. Id.
at 348.
384. § 1024.
385. Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 716.
386. 640 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 2009).
387. Id. at 77–78.
388. Id. at 77.
389. Id.
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chiatric evaluation, where he continued to threaten the president.390
The defendant was involuntarily committed, and his threats were
immediately reported to law enforcement authorities.391 He remained hospitalized in several different facilities for seven
months.392 He was released in January 2009 and arrested five
months later.393
At trial, the government sought to compel the testimony of the
defendant’s therapists as to the threats he made in May 2008.394 The
court adopted the Glass test and found that the dangerous-patient
exception permitted the therapists’ testimony.395 The court recognized that the defendant was not arrested until five months after his
release from the hospital and a year after he made the threats.396
Nonetheless, it found that the dangerous-patient exception applied
and required the therapists’ testimony at the criminal trial even
though it never addressed the second prong of the Glass test—
whether the testimony was the only means of averting harm to the
president.397
The California experience and the Hardy case illustrate the psychotherapist-patient privilege’s vulnerability and the slippery slope
towards its demise that is created once courts recognize the dangerous-patient exception to this privilege. Experience to date seems to
demonstrate that courts that have recognized this exception are unable to contain and limit its use to the rare situations in which it might
be justified. Therefore, as Appelbaum has suggested, this exception
should not be recognized, and courts, instead, should adhere to the
rule that patients’ communications during therapy are deserving of
protection.398

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 78.
Id.
Hardy, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 78.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 79–80.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80–81.
Appelbaum, supra note 224, at 714–16.

File: Paruch - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V3

2011

Created on: 6/7/2011 10:24:00 PM

Last Printed: 6/7/2011 11:51:00 PM

DANGEROUS-PATIENT EXCEPTION

399

B. The Appropriate Procedures and Burden of Proof
If one is to accept that there are some situations where a therapist’s testimony in a criminal trial is the only means of averting harm
to third persons, courts should employ procedures designed to minimize the public exposure of patient confidential information when
making this determination and in the other select situations which
may call for a therapist’s testimony. Consistent with Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a) and the Supreme Court decision United States v.
Zolin,399 courts should utilize in camera inspection of the proffered
evidence and require that any exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege be supported by a sufficient amount of proof.
The existence and the scope of a privilege are questions to be determined by the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
104(a).400 The Rule also provides that in making this determination,
a court is not bound by the rules of evidence, except the rules pertaining to privileges.401 One interpretation of this rule would require
that courts, in determining the existence or contour of a privilege,
consider only non-privileged evidence. However, the Supreme
Court rejected this argument in Zolin.402 In Zolin, the Court held
that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege need
not be established by independent evidence.403 The Court refused to
adopt an interpretation of Rule 104(a) that would treat the challenged
communications as privileged for all intents and purposes.404 It
found that the cost of imposing an absolute prohibition on the use of
this evidence for the purpose of establishing the exception was “into-

399. 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
400. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 104(a) provides:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
Id.
401. Id.
402. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566.
403. Id. at 568.
404. Id. at 566–68.
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lerably high.”405 It stated: “A per se rule that the communications in
question may never be considered creates, we feel, too great an impediment to the proper functioning of the adversary process.”406
The Court also held that, at the request of the party opposing the
privilege, an in camera review may be used to ascertain whether
purportedly privileged attorney-client communications would fall
within the crime-fraud exception.407 The Court seemed cognizant of
the practice in which federal prosecutors and civil litigants frequently invoked this exception in their attempts to defeat objections to
discovery.408 With this in mind, and while also recognizing the need
to protect “open and legitimate disclosure” between attorneys and
clients, the Court held that before conducting an in camera review,
the trial court should require a showing of a “factual basis adequate
to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person . . . that in camera review of the materials may reveal evidence to establish the
claim that the crime-fraud exception applies.”409 The Court also
held that this threshold requirement may be satisfied by means of
any lawfully obtained evidence that has not been determined to be
privileged.410 Finally, the Court reiterated its previous rulings that
the disclosure of allegedly privileged materials in camera does not
operate to waive or terminate the privilege.411
The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the approach espoused
in Zolin and, in doing so, issued additional cautionary instructions to
its lower courts, adding additional protection to the privilege.412 It
considered the problems inherent in having judges view information
that may be privileged when they are subsequently required to rule

405. Id. at 569.
406. Id.
407. The Court noted that the judge has discretion as to whether to conduct an in
camera review. Id. at 572. In making its decision, the Court instructed the judge
to consider the importance of the alleged privileged material to the case and the
likelihood that the evidence produced through the in camera review will fall within the crime-fraud exception. Id.
408. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 32, § 6.13.2, at 1185–86.
409. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 571–72.
410. Id. at 575.
411. Id. at 574–75.
412. In re Marriage of Decker, 606 N.E. 2d 1094, 1107–08 (Ill. 1992).
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on an issue that may be affected by the privileged information.413
The court suggested that once the threshold test for in camera review
is established, a different judge should conduct the in camera inspection.414 The court also suggested that the in camera questioning be
as narrow as possible to preserve the confidentiality of the information.415
The Eighth Circuit has also addressed this question and recommended procedures that a trial court should follow when determining
if the crime-fraud exception should apply.416 First, it noted that a
district court does not need to conduct a formal hearing or accept
additional evidence and argument once it determines that the exception does not apply.417 It also explained that, in the case of in camera review, the party to the privilege has the absolute right to be
heard by evidence and argument; the opposing party, however, shall
not be privy to the confidential materials unless it has been established that the crime-fraud exception applies.418 The court also explained that if the trial court finds that the exception applies, it
should keep the privileged communications under seal to prevent
any further disclosure until after all the appeals have been completed.419
Of special concern is the level of proof under Rule 104(a) that is
needed to establish an exception to a privilege. In Clark v. United
States,420 the Supreme Court indicated that a party opposing a privilege must make a showing of a “prima facie case”421 to the court that

413. See id.
414. Id. at 1107.
415. Id.
416. See In re General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 714 (8th Cir. 1998).
417. Id. at 716.
418. Id. at 717.
419. Id.
420. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
421. Id. at 14. “Prima facie” has been described as the “most rubbery” of legal
phrases. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2005). Prima
facie evidence is defined as “evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment in factor of the case which it supports, but which
may be contradicted by other evidence. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (9th ed.
2009).
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a privilege should be abrogated.422 Years later, in Bourjaily v. United States,423 a criminal case involving the co-conspirator exception
to the hearsay rule, the Court held that preliminary questions of fact
under Rule 104(a) must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.424 It stated: “The preponderance standard ensures that
before admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely
than not that the technical issues and policy concerns addressed by
the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration.”425 Unfortunately, the Zolin Court refused to address this question with respect to the crime-fraud exception, although it did indicate that a higher standard of proof is required for public disclosure
of allegedly privileged information than for in camera review.426
As the result of the Zolin Court’s refusal to address this question,
the lower federal courts have continued to struggle with the question
of the appropriate level of proof necessary to establish the crimefraud exception. The standard of proof in cases in which the issue
involved disclosure of confidential attorney-client communications
to a grand jury has been defined in a variety of ways, including
“some foundation in fact,” “reasonable basis,” and “reasonable
cause to believe.”427 Other courts have described this burden as the
equivalent of a “prima facie” case,428 a finding of “probable
cause,”429 or “more than suspicion but less than a preponderance of
evidence.”430
The Ninth Circuit recently held in In re Napster Inc. Copyright
Litigation that a party asserting the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege in a civil case must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the exception applies.431 The Ninth Circuit
found that requiring the existence of the crime-fraud exception to be
422. Clark, 289 U.S. at 14.
423. 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
424. Id. at 176.
425. Id. at 175.
426. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 570–72 (1989).
427. In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litigation, 479 F.3d 1078, 1093–94 (9th Cir.
2007), abrogated by Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
428. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49–50 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
429. In re John Doe, Inc., 13 F.3d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1994).
430. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1996).
431. 479 F.3d at 1095.
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proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard is “consonant
with the importance of the attorney-client privilege.”432 The court
also commented: “It would be very odd if . . . a court could find such
an important privilege vitiated where an exception to the privilege
has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence.”433
The court further supported its decision by noting the holding in
Bourjaily that Rule 104 requires that preliminary questions of fact
are to be determined by a preponderance of the evidence standard.434
Finally, although the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court
refused to address this specific question in Zolin, it indicated that it
believed Zolin signaled that preliminary questions regarding privileges should be established under Rule 104(a).435 In conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit noted that judicious use of in camera review, combined with a preponderance burden, strikes an appropriate balance
between recognizing “the importance of the attorney-client privilege
and deterrence of its abuse than a low threshold for outright disclosure.”436
Although the Napster court was careful to limit its holding to
civil cases, the reasoning it provided to support its decision can be
applied with equal force to criminal cases.437 Furthermore, this application in criminal cases is particularly appropriate in light of the
Supreme Court’s comment in Swidler & Berlin that “there is no case
authority for the proposition that the [attorney-client] privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases.”438
Although these cases all involved the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege, there is no reason that these procedures
should be restricted to cases involving the attorney-client privilege.
The psychotherapist-patient privilege should stand on equal footing
with the attorney-client privilege, and, as such, courts should not
vitiate this important privilege absent a finding by a preponderance
of the evidence that an exception applies. Nevertheless, it does not
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1096.
Id.
See In re Napster, 479 F.3d at 1096.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408–09 (1998).
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appear that any of the federal courts that addressed the dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege employed
in camera procedures, nor is it apparent what standard of proof the
courts applied.
An unreported decision from the Southern District of Florida,
United States v. Highsmith,439 illustrates a situation where these procedures should have been applied in order to preserve the confidentiality of the therapist-patient communications. In Highsmith, the
court held that the dangerous-patient exception did not apply because it was not shown that the therapist’s testimony was the only
means of averting harm.440 However, because the court did not engage in in camera review of the evidence proffered by the government to support its claim that the exception should apply, the confidentiality of the patient’s disclosures was unnecessarily destroyed
and the therapist-patient relationship was damaged as the result of
the public exposure of privileged information.441
The procedures recommended by the Zolin Court, and further
developed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, could be employed by
439. No. 07-80093-CR, 2007 WL 2406990 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2007).
440. Defendant Harry Nathaniel Highsmith was charged with threatening to kill
an Administrative Law Judge employed by the Social Security Administration’s
office of Hearings and Appeals. Id. at *1. In January 2007, the defendant voluntarily admitted himself into the Veteran’s Administration hospital in West Palm
Beach, Florida, suffering from homicidal and suicidal ideations. Id. He was
placed in a locked psychiatric unit. Id. During the first few days of his hospitalization, he repeatedly expressed to his treating psychiatrist a plan to shoot the judge
who had ruled against him in a Social Security proceeding. Id. He also indicated
that he had a gun, which he planned to use to carry out his plan. Id. The psychiatrist judged the threat to be credible and notified the judge and law enforcement officials of the threat. Highsmith, 2007 WL 2406990, at *1. A few days
later, the defendant’s suicidal and homicidal thoughts were resolved, and he was
discharged from the hospital. Id. He was arrested immediately following his discharge. Id. at *2. At trial, the prosecution sought to compel the testimony of his
therapist. Id. The court adopted the Glass test but ruled that the criteria were not
met. Id. at *3–4. It found that because the therapist had determined that the defendant was no longer a threat at the time of his release, it would be inconsistent to
conclude that this testimony would be the only means of averting the harm. Id.
Much of this information, which was freely disclosed and became part of the written opinion in the case, could have been protected through the use of in camera
procedures.
441. See id. at *3–4.
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all courts called upon to determine if any exceptions to the psychotherapist-patient privilege apply. These procedures are particularly
important in jurisdictions that have recognized the dangerous-patient
exception because they guard against the needless public disclosure
of confidential patient information and protect the confidentiality of
the therapist-patient relationship, which the Jaffee Court recognized
is a “sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment.”442
Therefore, in cases where a party seeks to compel a therapist to
testify as to communications made by a patient during therapy, a
court should follow the Zolin procedure and require a threshold
showing of a factual basis sufficient to support a good faith belief
that in camera review of the information will reveal evidence to establish an exception to the privilege. The court may then conduct an
in camera inspection of the privileged information only if it determines that this initial burden has been met. Moreover, the proponent
of the exception should have the burden of proving the dangerouspatient exception by a preponderance of the evidence. In jurisdictions that have recognized the dangerous-patient exception, the burden should be squarely on the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the patient’s threats were serious when
made and that the testimony of the therapist at the criminal trial is
the only means of averting harm. Furthermore, in demonstrating that
the therapist’s testimony is the “only” means of averting the harm,
the government should be required to show that it put forth reasonable efforts to locate other forms of proof and that the evidence
needed to establish this criterion is not available through any other
means.
VII. CONCLUSION
“An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but
results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better
than no privilege at all.”443
In Jaffee, the Supreme Court, operating under the authority
granted to it by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, which allows federal
442. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
443. Id. at 18 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)).
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courts to recognize new privileges by interpreting “common law
principles . . . in the light of reason and experience,”444 held that a
psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized in the federal
courts.445 The Court found that important public and private interests are served by protecting the confidences of patients in therapy
because effective psychotherapy demands “an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and
complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.”446 It
also recognized that: “The mental health of our citizenry, no less
than its physical health, is a public good of transcendent importance.”447
However, much confusion has arisen as the result of the Court’s
offhand remarks in footnote 19 of the opinion, and this confusion
threatens the continued viability of the privilege.448 In situations
where a patient has made threatening statements against federal officials or federal employees during therapy, and where the therapist
reported such threats to law enforcement authorities pursuant to state
law, these patients have found themselves charged with violations of
federal criminal laws. Federal prosecutors, seizing upon these reports as a convenient means of obtaining evidence, seek to have
courts compel the testimony of these therapists at the patient’s criminal trial. This testimony is often the only evidence the prosecution
needs to secure a conviction.
This article has argued against the recognition of the dangerouspatient exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Simply
put, there is little legal support or justification for the exception other
than the Jaffee Court’s casual dicta. This exception is not justified
by “reason and experience.” There is no support in the legislative
history of Rule 501. Indeed, the contrary is true. Neither the experience of the states, nor the developed body of federal common law
with respect to the other communication privileges, provides justification for the exception. Moreover, this exception requires courts to
engage in a case-by-case balancing test—a procedure that was spe444.
445.
446.
447.
448.

Id. at 8 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 n.19.
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cifically rejected by the Jaffee Court because “[m]aking the promise
of confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of
the relative importance of the patient’s interests in privacy and the
evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the effectiveness of
the privilege.”449
The guiding principle behind the Jaffee Court’s decision to recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege was to protect the confidentiality of patient disclosures in therapy with the goal of improving the nation’s mental health. The important policies served by this
privilege are threatened by the dangerous-patient exception, which
has the demonstrated potential for significant abuse if not curtailed
and could lead to a general erosion of the privilege. Instead, courts
should adopt the approach that preserves and protects this vital privilege and the special relationships to which it is attached.

449. Id. at 17.

